

The University of Chicago

HENRY J. RAYMOND AND
THE *NEW YORK TIMES* DURING
RECONSTRUCTION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1933

By
DOROTHY DODD

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

1936

Ex Libris

SEYMOUR DURST

t' Fort nieuw Amsterdam op de Manhatans



FORT NEW AMSTERDAM



(NEW YORK), 1651

*When you leave, please leave this book
Because it has been said
"Ever'thing comes t' him who waits
Except a loaned book."*

OLD YORK LIBRARY — OLD YORK FOUNDATION

AVERY ARCHITECTURAL AND FINE ARTS LIBRARY

GIFT OF SEYMOUR B. DURST OLD YORK LIBRARY

The University of Chicago

HENRY J. RAYMOND AND
THE *NEW YORK TIMES* DURING
RECONSTRUCTION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1933

By
DOROTHY DODD

Private Edition, Distributed by
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1936

042 299

80874



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014

<https://archive.org/details/henryjraymondnew00dodd>

CHAPTER I
THE EDITOR AND HIS PAPER

At the close of the Civil War there were two minority factions within the Union party with well-formulated and antagonistic ideas regarding the procedure to be followed in restoring the southern states to the Union. A group which found its leadership in influential and able members of Congress had determined upon a harsh and repressive policy toward the South, while a less adamant group surrounding the President advocated a moderate and conciliatory program. The practical political problem facing each faction was the formation and consolidation of public opinion in support of its program. Under such circumstances the disposition of the press was of supreme importance, and nowhere was this more true than in New York. The New York press even at that time was more nearly national in influence than that of any other city or state, but irrespective of this fact, the political weight of New York was such as to lend importance to its newspapers.

The New York press at the beginning of Reconstruction included several great newspapers under the guidance of as able editors as the country has ever known. Of these journals, Horace Greeley's Tribune had a weekly circulation of such range as to make it almost a national institution. More restricted in range, and thus in influence, the Sun, Herald, World, Times, and Evening Post yet were powerful organs in a city and state whose support or opposition would be of great consequence to the success of any plan for the restoration of the Union. Their relative influence on popular opinion is indicated to a certain extent by a comparison of their circulations. While accurate figures are wanting, estimates of daily circulations seem to justify the following ranking: Herald, Sun, Tribune, Times, World, Evening Post.¹ But the influence that a paper wielded was not a matter of circulation alone. Such

¹The Times printed about 35,000 copies, as compared with 50,000 for the Sun and 20,000 for the Evening Post. Allan Nevins, The Evening Post, a Century of Journalism, 326. The Herald probably ran over 70,000 and the Tribune about the same as the Sun.

imponderables as the personality and ability of its editor, the class of society from which it drew its readers, and its past record also played important parts in determining its prestige. On these grounds The New York Times could claim a prominence that its daily circulation did not warrant. Edited by a man who was possessed at once of the best qualities of the reporter and the editor, it had become a family newspaper for the substantial, respectable, upper middle class citizen.² And it had come through the war with a reputation second to none for unswerving devotion to the Union.

Since its founding in 1851 the Times had been edited by Henry Jarvis Raymond. An up-state New Yorker by birth,³ though of French extraction, Raymond was slightly built and small of stature, with the round head that is frequently a mark of Celtic blood. As a young man he wore a closely trimmed beard which was curtailed in later years to side whiskers and a moustache. He had a firm chin, a long upper lip beneath a short broad nose, and dark hair which swept back from a wide forehead. He had none of the sartorial peculiarities of Greeley. Contemporaries noted that he dressed neatly, though not extravagantly; one observer speaks of his "neat, dapper person, which seemed made for an overcoat."⁴ Neither did he possess the eccentricities of character that distinguished Greeley and the elder James Gordon Bennett.

Raymond's course during Reconstruction caused his friends to follow his opponents in attributing to him a habit of indecision which they magnified into an eccentricity. They wished to explain, if not to justify, his unpopular actions, but they only succeeded in fastening upon him a not entirely warranted reputation as a "waverer" and a "trimmer." Raymond was a man of singularly equable temperament and of open mind, qualities which went far to explain the success of the Times as a journalistic venture. Such a nature

²The class of readers among whom the Times circulated can be judged by its advertising columns. It carried heavy banking and other financial advertising.

³Raymond was born in Lima, New York, January 24, 1820, the son of Jarvis and Lavinia Brockway Raymond. Augustus Maverick, Henry J. Raymond and the New York Press, 14.

⁴John R. Young, "Men Who Reigned," in Melville Philips, ed., The Making of a Newspaper, 290.

did not lend itself to the passions and rancors of the post-war period, and Raymond's disinclination to pursue an uncompromisingly aggressive course, even in the cause of moderation, led commentators to characterize him as vacillating and uncertain. Friendly observers stated that his was the hesitancy "of a thinker in a constant state of doubt,"⁵ while his enemies jeered at his apparent inconsistencies.⁶ Intransigence was foreign to his nature, but his purpose was firm. His weakness lay not in indecision, but in his inability to impress his purpose upon others.

Raymond was to fail to substantiate a claim to leadership at a crucial period of the nation's history, but for many years he proved himself adept at political manipulation in the restricted but intricate field of New York politics. He was inveterate in his attendance upon political conventions, where his facile pen was ever ready to produce resolutions and addresses. He was distinguished for his tact. "All men have sharp points," he once said to Augustus Maverick; "what is the use of running against them?" Acting upon this view, Raymond "dealt in aquafortis only when his antagonists insisted upon being bitten. Under ordinary circumstances, he dealt in oil."⁷ In his first editorial in the Times he promised his readers that he would avoid writing as if he were in a passion. "There are very few things in this world which it is worth while to get angry about," he added; "and they are just the things that anger will not improve."⁸ It was a promise that he kept.

Raymond brought to the Times a varied experience as a journalist. After graduation from the University of Vermont in 1840, he had found employment on Greeley's weekly New Yorker and had

⁵Philips, ed., The Making of a Newspaper, 290.

⁶While Raymond was a member of Congress he had occasion to leave Washington and appealed on the floor of the House for a pair. "'Old Thad' [Stevens] looked around sarcastically and remarked that he did not understand that the gentleman from New York was asking for a pair; he had observed that that gentleman found no difficulty in pairing with himself." George R. Brown, ed., Reminiscences of Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada, 206.

⁷Maverick, "Henry J. Raymond and the 'Times'," Galaxy, VIII, 270.

⁸Times, Sept. 18, 1851, as quoted in Maverick, Raymond, 98.

continued as Greeley's assistant on the Tribune, which was founded the next year. Even at this period the relations between the two men were not entirely happy, for Raymond felt that he was underpaid.⁹ After he left the Tribune in 1843, circumstances tended to increase the feeling between them until it amounted to a thinly veiled hostility. In 1846 they engaged in a heated controversy on the merits of socialism, which Greeley was championing at the time. After the founding of the Times Greeley felt that the new paper was supplanting the Tribune in the favor of Weed and Seward.¹⁰ It was he who, in a squabble over the publication of New York bank statements, dubbed Raymond "The Little Villain," an epithet that Raymond good-naturedly accepted.¹¹ Petty though such incidents were, they served to augment the hostility between the two editors to the point where it was almost sufficient grounds for the Times to oppose a measure if the Tribune favored it.

Raymond had left the Tribune to take a position on James Watson Webb's Courier and Enquirer, which was still a powerful paper though it had lost the preëminence that it had enjoyed in the Thirties. By 1850 he had been able to buy into the Courier and Enquirer, but the next year he broke with Webb by refusing to use his political influence in behalf of Webb's candidacy for the United States Senate. The termination of his connection with the Courier and Enquirer did not leave Raymond entirely adrift, as he had formed a connection with the Harpers several years before and had become managing editor of Harper's Magazine when it was started in June, 1850.¹² His duties on that periodical did not occupy his

⁹Maverick, Raymond, 34.

¹⁰Ralph Ray Fahrney, "Horace Greeley, The Tribune, and the Civil War," 12. Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, I, 368, says that by 1854 Raymond had forced Greeley out of first place in the confidence of Seward and Weed.

¹¹Don C. Seitz, Horace Greeley, Founder of The New York Tribune, 109. This is evidently the incident to which Greeley referred in his letter to Seward, November 11, 1854, dissolving the political firm of Weed, Seward, and Greeley.

¹²Raymond continued as editor until February, 1856, when he resigned in order to devote his entire time to the Times. Joseph Henry Harper, The House of Harper: A Century of Publishing in Franklin Square, 85, 157.

energies, and he put into execution an idea he had held for some time of starting a new daily in New York city.

E. L. Godkin says in his reminiscences that the Times was started

"as a sort of via media to suit the numerous moderate or timid people who were coming over to the Republican party from both the Whigs and the Democrats, but were as yet unequal to the strong anti-slavery drink of the Tribune."¹³

This can hardly stand as a true statement of motive in view of the date of the Times' founding, though it seems to be a correct description of a movement that later occurred. Yet it must be conceded that the political motive was present to a considerable extent in a man as keenly interested in politics as Raymond was. The prospectus of the Times declared that the paper would maintain principles "held by the great Whig party of the United States more nearly than by any other political organization," and that it would be conservative and seek to allay rather than excite agitation.¹⁴

But the Times was started primarily as a business venture rather than as a political organ. Raymond and George Jones,¹⁵ who was associated with him in the founding of the paper, are said to have been inspired by the report that the Tribune had made a profit of \$60,000 the previous year. The Tribune and the Herald were at that time the largest and most prosperous papers in the city, having for competitors only the expensive Wall Street journals which published little news. Raymond and Jones believed that a cheap paper, which avoided Bennett's crudities and Greeley's advocacy of intellectual fads, such as socialism, which had earned for their papers the ill-favor of many conservative readers, would be a profitable venture. Whether or not their analysis of the situation was correct, the ever-increasing population of New York afforded a circulation that brought financial success and soon gave the Times rank as one of the great dailies of the metropolis.

¹³Rollo Ogden, ed., Life and Letters of Edwin Lawrence Godkin, I, 113.

¹⁴Maverick, Raymond, 94.

¹⁵Jones assumed the editorship of the Times after Raymond's death and directed its notable exposé of the Tweed Ring. Little has been written about him. The best account is Elmer Davis' brief article in the Dictionary of American Biography, X, 171.

In August, 1851, Raymond, George Jones, and E. B. Wesley, of Albany, formed Raymond, Jones & Co. to publish the Times. The articles of partnership limited the control of Jones and Wesley to the financial and mechanical departments of the paper. Entire control of the editorial department was vested in Raymond.¹⁶ As long as Raymond lived he, and he alone, determined the editorial policy of the Times. This does not mean that he wrote every editorial, which manifestly would have been impossible, or even that he read before publication every editorial written by subordinates. Indeed, Thurlow Weed, remarking in 1865 that the organization of large New York journals left them without editorial responsibility, said that he found "Raymond almost every morning as much surprised at his Editorial columns as the hen was with a brood of young ducks."¹⁷ Yet Raymond did formulate the Times' policy, and though few of its editorials can definitely be ascribed to him, it undoubtedly is true that any clearly defined policy of the paper represented his personal convictions.

Raymond's absolute control of the Times has been questioned by contemporary and later writers, who intimate that the policy of the paper was dictated by Weed as leader of the old Whig faction of the Republican party, to which Raymond belonged. Gideon Welles, always hostile to Seward and Weed, speaks of the Times as "a profligate Seward and Weed organ, wholly unreliable," and of its editor as "a subservient follower" of the two New York politicians.¹⁸ Both Alexander and Brummer, in their histories of New York politics, designate the Times as a Seward and Weed organ.¹⁹ The close political association of the three men during two momentous decades lends color to the charge. The cooperation of the trio apparently was closest in matters pertaining to state politics; on national questions, especially after 1861, there was frequently a marked divergence of opinion. Where a community of interest and opinion

¹⁶Times "Jubilee Supplement," Sept. 18, 1901.

¹⁷Weed to John Bigelow, Nov. 19, 1865; Bigelow, Retrospections or an Active Life, III, 223.

¹⁸Diary of Gideon Welles, II, 87 (July 26, 1864), 104 (Aug. 13, 1864).

¹⁹DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York, II, 254; Sidney David Brummer, Political History of New York State during the Period of the Civil War, 18.

existed, as was frequently the case, the Times undoubtedly expressed the views of all three. In 1865, after Weed had sold the Albany Evening Journal, Raymond urged him to join the staff of the Times, but he declined the invitation.²⁰ On the whole there seems to be no justification for the charge that Weed and Seward, or either of them, dictated the policy of the Times.²¹

Journalistically and politically, then, the Times was Raymond's creature. In building his paper he acted on the belief that a journalist should interpret popular sentiment and seek to guide it along moderate paths rather than to force upon it acceptance of extreme measures. On occasion he bent his policy to conform to popular opinion. Temperamentally a reporter of facts rather than a moralist, Raymond saw fanatical advocacy of reform as no part of an editor's duty. He did believe, however, that desirable changes could be effected by moderate, reasoned criticism of social and political evils. He was a keen controversial writer, but his editorial page was remarkably free from the bitter personalities commonly found in American papers of the period. An excellent reporter himself, he recognized fully the value of timely, accurate reporting; the Times was a newspaper in the true sense of the word.²² Its columns were open to discussions of literature and art and to descriptions of travel that made it of interest to all members of a family.²³ Raymond's policy, in short, was that which the Times still successfully follows of accurate, decent reporting, wide news coverage, and moderate editorials. His success well justified E. L. Godkin's statement that "in the

²⁰Weed to Bigelow, May 29, 1865; Bigelow, Retrospections, II, 575.

²¹See Elmer Davis, History of The New York Times, 1851-1921, 16 f.

²²Daniel Webster always sent for Raymond to report his speeches because of the almost incredible rapidity with which the newspaper man could write, and because of his accuracy in reporting the orator's Latin quotations. Raymond reported the Austro-Sardinian War for the Times. He was present at the first battle of Bull Run and was unable to correct his early report of a Union victory because of federal censorship.

²³The Times first published F. L. Olmsted's classic letters from the South.

art of making a paper" Raymond was a master,²⁴ and even the cap-
tious Greeley conceded that, though he had met abler and stronger
men, he had never seen a cleverer, readier, more efficient jour-
nalist than Raymond.²⁵

Not the least of Raymond's merits as a journalist was his
quiet refusal to use his paper to further his political ambitions.
It is true that if he had been free of politics he would have been
a greater editor, for "he was an editor constantly trammelled by
his sense of the necessities and limitations of his position as a
politician."²⁶ But his concern was for the group he represented,
not for himself. Without the prestige of the Times he probably
never would have achieved as great a degree of political impor-
tance as he did. But though active in politics from before the
founding of the Times until shortly before his death, and often a
candidate for office, Raymond never used the columns of his paper
to advance his own candidacy. James Melvin Lee says of him in
this connection that "he was the first great editor to place his
newspaper before himself."²⁷ He sought to make of the Times an
institution rather than an organ for personal advancement.

²⁴Nation, VII, 490.

²⁵Recollections of a Busy Life, 138.

²⁶Nation, loc. cit.

²⁷History of American Journalism (rev. ed.), 273.

CHAPTER II POLITICS AND PATRIOTISM

Raymond's career as an aspirant for political office began in 1849, when he was elected to the Legislature from the Ninth Ward of New York city. He displayed considerable ability as a debater, and upon being returned the next year, was elected Speaker. The contest over the United States senatorship in 1851 showed him cooperating with Seward and Weed for the election of Hamilton Fish over James Watson Webb, who at the time was his employer. Raymond had won the esteem of Weed as early as 1848, when the latter had considered turning over to him the editorship of the Albany Evening Journal in order to appease certain Whigs whom Weed had offended. The project fell through, and a coolness arose between the two men for a time because of Raymond's attacks in the Courier and Enquirer on Weed's "dangerous free soil tendencies," as provocative of party discord.¹ The breach was soon healed; Raymond himself gradually became an advocate of free-soil principles, though he was never extreme in his opposition to slavery.

Raymond fully realized the political implications of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and predicted that the sentiment which it engendered in the North would result in the election of Seward to the presidency in 1856.² He was a delegate to the Anti-Nebraska state convention which met at Saratoga in August, 1854, but he agreed with Weed that fusion of all anti-slavery forces in New York, as urged by the Tribune, was inexpedient. To stake the governorship and Seward's reelection to the Senate on the uncertain prospect of a successful coalition of anti-slavery elements, otherwise antagonistic, was to run too great a risk in view of a Whig victory, which a divided Democracy made probable. The Saratoga convention decided against the formation of a new party at that time and adjourned to meet late in September at Auburn, where the Whig ticket, headed by Myron H. Clark for governor and Raymond

¹Thurlow Weed Barnes, Memoir of Thurlow Weed, 190 f.

²Times, June 1, 1854, cited in Alexander, Political History of New York, II, 205.

for lieutenant-governor, was adopted. Though the expediency of Weed's policy was demonstrated by a Whig success, the election clearly showed that old party lines were disintegrating and that a new political alignment was inevitable. The Kansas situation hastened the change, and in 1855 the Whigs merged themselves in the Republican party with the full approval of Seward, Weed, and Raymond.

Once committed to the Republican party, Raymond took an active part in the formation of a national organization. He attended the conference of party leaders at Pittsburgh in February, 1856, which called the Philadelphia convention, and wrote the address stating the objects of the new party. The address pledged the party to seek repeal of all laws allowing introduction of slavery in territories north of the Missouri Compromise line and to resist by every constitutional means existence of slavery in any of the territories of the United States; it declared in favor of the immediate admission of Kansas as a free state. Free-soil sentiment was thus emphasized because it alone could be depended upon to effect the synthesis of the new party. But Raymond's personal interest in the anti-slavery animus of the Republican organization probably was subordinate to his interest in its expressed purpose "to oppose and overthrow the present national administration."³ Though decidedly conservative in his opposition to slavery, he was always pronounced in his condemnation of the southern minority in control at Washington.⁴ Raymond toured New York state for the Republican ticket, but he refused to allow his friends to place his name in nomination for governor for fear that his former activities as a Whig would repel free-soil Democrats.

Raymond's instinct for taking the middle of the road asserted itself in 1858, when the contest between Lincoln and Douglas attracted nation-wide attention. Accepting the doctrine of popular sovereignty as likely to give Kansas a free-soil consti-

³Quoted in James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, II, 119. The Times of March 2, 1865, stated that the purpose of the Republican party had been fulfilled by the exclusion of slavery from Kansas and by the election of a president in 1860.

⁴See account of Raymond's debate with L. B. Chase, October 11 and 20, 1865, in Maverick, Raymond, 150 f.

tution, he favored the return of Douglas to the Senate unopposed by the Republican party.⁵ In this position he occupied common ground with Greeley and Seward,⁶ and it is probable that he even favored a fusion of Douglas Democrats and Republicans.

If there had been any disloyalty to the Republican party in Raymond's position in 1868, all trace of it had vanished by 1860, when he went with Weed to the Chicago convention expecting to see Seward nominated for the presidency. Seward's defeat embittered Raymond, but not against the party or the successful candidate. His severe disappointment vented itself in an attack upon Greeley, whom he charged with having sought and effected Seward's defeat in retaliation for past political slights.⁷ In the same letter in which he made the charge, he described a visit to Springfield, whither he had accompanied the committee that notified Lincoln of his nomination. He spoke highly of Lincoln's intellectual ability and honesty of purpose, but expressed some apprehension that he might lack the firmness of will and the experience in practical politics necessary in the passing crisis. In an editorial of May 31, the Times stated that neither Seward nor his friends cherished the slightest feeling of dissatisfaction with Lincoln, to whom no one could attribute unfair dealing in obtaining the nomination, and that they would support him with vigor and fidelity. The Times was as good as its word and gave Lincoln its hearty support.

During the early months of the campaign the Times refused to take seriously southern threats of disunion. Even after the election it looked "for a great deal of violent talk in the Southern States," but had "entire faith in the final subsidence of these waves of popular frenzy [sic]."⁸ Not until the latter part on November would it admit that the secession movement was assuming formidable proportions. Then, denying the right of secession under the Constitution as it stood, the Times suggested that the

⁵Alexander, op. cit., II, 247; Harper's Weekly, XIII, 417.

⁶See Rhodes, op. cit., II, 305.

⁷Letter from Auburn, May 22, 1860, in the Times, May 24, 1860. Raymond's charge resulted in the publication of Greeley's famous letter of November 11, 1854, repudiating all further political friendship with Seward.

⁸Times, Nov. 7, 1860.

southern states submit alternative propositions for constitutional amendments, and "demand either such additional guaranties as they require, or if they be refused, permission to withdraw from the Union." This was the only way, it said, in which a peaceful separation could be effected.⁹ Two days later it stated that if the "fixed and irrevocable mood of the Southern mind" was for disunion, "then we must make up our minds that we shall have no union. Our Government was formed by consent, and by consent it must be preserved."¹⁰ When, a month later, however, Greeley published his editorial, "Let Them Go!", the Times declared that Greeley proposed a surrender of everything like government, and thenceforth steadfastly refused to consider the possibility of a dissolution of the Union under any conditions or method of procedure.

Raymond early joined Weed in demanding a compromise that would save the Union without a resort to arms. The Times insisted upon repudiation of the right of secession and upon acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Constitution by the South as prerequisites to any compromise.¹¹ The inviolability of the Union having been acknowledged in principle, the North could safely and honorably make concessions in regard to slavery. The Times was willing to have the Missouri Compromise line reestablished so long as no additions of territory were contemplated. But it objected to the Crittenden Compromise because under it "the whole future growth of the Republic" would be dedicated by an unalterable provision of the Constitution "to the extension and perpetuation of African Slavery."¹² The Times' own compromise plan, borrowed from Charles Francis Adams, proposed that Congress should never legislate for abolition of slavery in any state; that the fugitive slave law should be amended to secure its better execution while omitting its harshest features; that all existing territory should be erected into two states with the northern boundary of New Mexico as the dividing line, each state to retain its existing institutions and to be divided later according to the provisions of the Constitution; and that no foreign territory should thereafter be acquired except with the consent of three-fourths of all the states.¹³

⁹Ibid., Nov. 19, 1860.

¹⁰Ibid., Nov. 21, 1860.

¹¹Ibid., Feb. 14, 1861.

¹²Ibid., Feb. 6, 1861.

¹³Ibid., Feb. 14, 1861.

Raymond continued to advocate compromise after he had come to believe that a satisfactory settlement was impossible of achievement, in the hope that a display of reasonableness on the part of the North would draw the border states to that section. In a speech to the Republican Club of New York city on February 26, he said that though he would make no compromise with traitors, he would go far to conciliate the loyal men in the border states. He proposed toward that end "to nationalize Republicanism" by a non-sectional administration of the party.¹⁴ Immediately upon the election of Lincoln the Times had urged the inclusion in the Cabinet of such border state Unionists as John Bell, John Minor Botts, and Henry Winter Davis.¹⁵ After the February elections demonstrated the existence of strong Union sentiment in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Missouri, the Times repeatedly urged concessions to "our friends in the Border States."¹⁶

The Times even went so far in this direction as to advocate evacuation of Fort Sumter, which it declared to be untenable. In spite of the fact that it had persistently maintained the right of the federal government to use coercion in the protection of its property and the enforcement of its laws,¹⁷ the paper, as a matter of policy, would have foregone the right. Shall we alienate the border states forever, it demanded in an editorial of March 12, "by this wanton and criminal pursuit of an impracticable point of honor"? The seeming inability of the administration to decide whether it would pursue honor or expediency soon caused the Times to desist from the advocacy of any particular policy and to demand the adoption of some policy. "In a great crisis like this," it declared, "there is no policy so fatal as that of having no policy at all."¹⁸ Though it had earnestly sought a peaceful settlement of the crisis, the Times almost welcomed the firing on Fort Sumter. "The South has chosen war," it said, "and it must

¹⁴ Ibid., March 1, 1861.

¹⁵ Ibid., Nov. 12, 1860.

¹⁶ Ibid., Feb. 21, 1861.

¹⁷ The very idea of government, the Times argued, involves the power to govern, and the essence of this power is the right to use force. There was no question of coercing a state; the Constitution operates upon individuals. Ibid., Dec. 18, 1860. See also issues of Nov. 9, Dec. 13, 1860; Jan. 18, 1861.

¹⁸ Ibid., April 3, 1861.

have all the war it wants."¹⁹ And from that day there was no more ardent advocate of energetic, unflinching prosecution of the war than the Times.

It was this desire to see the war pressed to a swift and victorious conclusion that caused the Times, in the early months of the conflict, severely to criticise Lincoln's administration. Day after day in the later part of April, editorials demanded immediate offensive action.²⁰ The paper even suggested that the conduct of the war be assumed by Congress, since it doubted if the administration had the wisdom and courage to secure an early peace by the only possible means--conquest.²¹ Yet it blamed the Tribune, with its cry of "Forward to Richmond!" for the disaster at Bull Run, and demanded that military amateurs such as the Blairs and Greeley "give place to men of cooler temper and of wiser heads" in the councils of the President.²²

As the war dragged into its second year with few victories and no prospect of a speedy termination, the Times, holding it "perfectly idle to conceal the fact that, as we stand to-day, we are beaten," called upon the President to reorganize the Cabinet and the army.²³ All during the late summer and fall of 1862 it urged the removal of generals who did not win battles, and when McClellan's removal finally came, it declared that the country breathed freer.²⁴ It was just as persistent, though always impersonal, in its demand for Cabinet changes. Lincoln, it said, having made use of his Cabinet to dispose of his rivals for the presidency, had reduced his secretaries to the condition of clerks, and had ostentatiously overloaded himself with the responsibility for their shortcomings, thus depriving the country and himself of needed coöperation and advice. Lincoln must abandon this personal administration "or the ruin of his country" would be "the price of his presumption." He should give the country "a responsible Cabinet," composed of its strongest and best men.²⁵ After the Cabinet crisis of December, 1862, however, when Lincoln refused to accept the resignation of either Seward or Chase, the Times, though not

¹⁹Ibid., April 13, 1861. ²⁰Ibid., April 23 and 25, 1861.

²¹Ibid., April 30, 1861. See also issue of June 9, 1861.

²²Ibid., July 25 and 26, 1861.

²³Ibid., Sept. 6, 1862. ²⁴Ibid., Nov. 11, 1862.

²⁵Ibid., Sept. 13, 1862.

at all certain that retention of the Cabinet without change was the most desirable conclusion to the incident, ceased its demands for a reorganization.²⁶

While, through the columns of the Times, Raymond hammered away at the idea that every consideration must be subordinated to a successful prosecution of the war, in New York state he was seeking to build up a Union party that would support the administration's assumption of extraordinary powers to that end. The war had swept aside local administrative issues and had made national questions of supreme importance in New York politics. Instead of wiping out factional lines within the Republican party, however, it was drawing them ever more sharply between the Seward-Weed-Raymond Conservatives and the Greeley Radicals, thus providing a ready-made opposition to Andrew Johnson in New York state in 1865, when the Conservatives should espouse his cause.²⁷

By joint action of a People's state convention and a Republican state convention, a Union state ticket had been nominated in 1861, and Raymond had been elected to the Assembly. Continuance of the movement for a Union party, as opposed to re-appearance of the old lines of party division, was at stake in the contest for the speakership, for which Raymond was a candidate. He succeeded in winning the nomination, at the same time forcing acceptance of support of the Union state ticket and of the national administration as tests of party loyalty, and was elected over his Democratic opponent.²⁸ The fight was not yet won, however, for in March the Republican State Committee, controlled by men opposed to sinking the Republican party in a Union organization, adopted resolutions pointing to repudiation of the Union movement and to revival of the Republican organization. Weed, who favored a Union party, was in Europe, and the leadership of proponents of a Union organization devolved upon Raymond. He proposed that members of the Legislature call a Union convention, and after some maneuvering he secured a reorganization of the state committee favorable to the Union movement. The new committee cooperated with a legislative committee in arranging for the state convention, which met at Syracuse late in September.²⁹

²⁶ Ibid., Dec. 23, 1862.

²⁷ Brummer, Political History of New York, 443.

²⁸ Ibid., 180 ff.

²⁹ Ibid., 191 ff.

Raymond was elected president of the Republican-Union convention but the Radicals controlled it. In conformity with a policy which he had repeatedly advocated in the Times, of elevating War Democrats to office, he favored the nomination of John A. Dix for governor, while the Greeley wing of the party wanted James S. Wadsworth because of his strong anti-slavery sentiments. Publication of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation shortly before the convention strengthened Wadsworth's candidacy and he was nominated on the first ballot. Raymond campaigned actively for Wadsworth and the Times supported him vigorously, while attempting to attach the stigma of treason to the Democratic candidate. Interpreting Seymour's election as a "vote of want of confidence" in Lincoln, the Times returned to its favorite theme. It declared that while no one doubted the President's moral earnestness and patriotism, he must "brace up his will" in order that "henceforth all men and all things shall bend to the one sole object of making the speediest conquest of this rebellion."³⁰

It was this same insistence upon a single war aim that caused the Times to seek to keep the slavery question in the background. Raymond's temperament was such that he had never felt any sympathy for the extreme anti-slavery position, and though opposing further extension of slavery, he had always maintained the sanctity of the institution in any state in which it existed. The Times vigorously opposed demands of Sumner, Phillips, and other abolitionists for an emancipation proclamation in the fall of 1861. Such a proclamation, it said, would split the North, creating in every state a powerful party in opposition to a war to end slavery, and would greatly weaken Union strength in the border states.³¹ Initiation of measures for the extinction of slavery, the Times held, should come from the legislatures of the loyal slave states rather than from Congress or from the people of the North.

"The real battle-ground of this rebellion," it said, "is in the Border Slave States. The greatest calamity which could befall the nation now would be the adoption of a policy which should arrest the active development of loyalty in those Border States, and sweep them again into the vortex of rebellion."³²

³⁰Times, Nov. 7, 1862.

³¹Ibid., Oct. 9, 1861.

³²Ibid., Nov. 28, 1861.

When Lincoln proposed his compensated emancipation plan to Congress, the Times cautiously endorsed it as a step in the right direction since it placed the government on the side of freedom. The paper was careful, however, to point out practical difficulties in the way of the plan and to warn that it would "offer no substantial reason for departing, even in appearance, from the doctrine that, with Slavery in the States, the National Government has no concern whatever."³³ Needless to say, the Times heartily endorsed Lincoln's reply to Greeley's "Prayer of Twenty Millions," in which the President stated that his action regarding slavery would be governed solely by the idea of saving the Union.³⁴ Raymond may have had some intimation then of the approaching issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, for the Times said that the time was rapidly approaching when the government would be in a position to make an emancipation decree effective, and to inflict thereby a terrible blow upon the rebel power.³⁵ When, a month later, Lincoln's proclamation was published, the Times declared that the wisdom of the step was unquestionable and its necessity indisputable. It was careful to justify the proclamation on the grounds of military necessity, and it optimistically predicted that it would cause "the whole fabric of rebellion--[to] tumble to the ground."³⁶

Far from ushering in the downfall of the Confederacy, the new year brought with it a defeatist movement of serious proportions. In the Middle West Copperheads wanted a truce for the purpose of calling a general convention which might effect a compromise between the warring sections, while in the East Greeley favored foreign mediation. The Tribune of January 22, 1863, proposed, if three months more of fighting should not crush the rebellion, that the North bow to its "destiny and make the best attainable peace." The Times strenuously combatted all such proposals as essentially traitorous because, if carried out, they would put "an end to the Union just as complete and final as if we had disbanded our army and made our bow to the Confederate President." Any concession, except that of pardon and oblivion in return for submission, would be construed as an acknowledgment

³³Ibid., March 7 and 8, 1862.

³⁴Rhodes, History of the United States, IV, 74.

³⁵Times, Aug. 26, 1862. ³⁶Ibid., Sept. 23 and 28, 1862.

of the justifiability of the insurrection and would draw from posterity the verdict "that in the greatest crisis of our history we waged war like lions---negotiated like asses, and made a peace which put an end to our National existence."³⁷ The only road to peace, the Times repeatedly declared, was through war--"stern, unflagging, inexorable war."³⁸

As a means to this end, the Times welcomed the Conscription Act of 1863, hailing it as "the grandest pledge yet given that our Government means to prevail, and will prevail."³⁹ Indeed the act put into execution a policy persistently advocated by the Times since the summer of 1862, when in almost daily editorials it pleaded for a draft of a million men to be trained and held in reserve for use whenever necessary.⁴⁰ Even after passage of the Conscription Act, the paper continued to urge that a reserve army be created and that enlistments be made for the duration of the war rather than for short terms. The draft riots of July, 1863, only strengthened the Times in its support of conscription. It denied that the mob truly represented the people and called upon state officers to execute the law, even though resort to force were necessary.⁴¹

The restoration of some sections of the South to federal control in 1863 gave substance to proposals of methods of reconstructing the Union. Sumner had early advanced his plan to abolish the seceding states and to reorganize them as territories governed from Washington. The Times denounced the plan, which the Tribune endorsed, as one that would render peace impossible, sweep away the Constitution and the Union as then constituted, and erect a centralized despotism. The real object of its proponents, the paper said, was to make a way to abolish slavery in the states.⁴² It held the doctrine to be false that the rebel states had lost their essential state polity by their rebellion, as implying that secession was possible and an actual fact, and it maintained that slavery would be abolished by state action.⁴³ The Times argued that

"reconstruction of the Union would be accomplished by the

³⁷ Ibid., Feb. 9, 1863.

³⁸ Ibid., Feb. 7, 1863.

³⁹ Ibid., Feb. 20, 1863.

⁴⁰ Ibid., Aug. 4, 5, and 6, 1863.

⁴¹ Ibid., July 14 and 15, 1863.

⁴² Ibid., Feb. 26, 1862.

⁴³ Ibid., Sept. 8, 1863.

voluntary return of the several rebellious states, through the action of their people in deposing the rebel authorities, repudiating the rebel Confederate Government, reorganizing their State Legislatures and Executives, renewing their allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and sending members to represent them in both Houses of the National Congress."⁴⁴

Thus the Times anticipated by some three months the principle of reconstruction embodied in the Amnesty Proclamation which Lincoln transmitted to Congress with his message of December 8, 1863.⁴⁵

The Times had opened its campaign for the renomination of Lincoln as early as September 7 with a laudatory editorial captioned, "The Right Man in the Right Place," in which it expressed its gratitude to heaven for a ruler as "peculiarly adapted to the needs of the times as clear-headed, dispassionate, discreet, steadfast, honest Abraham Lincoln." But it was largely on the President's reconstruction plan that it based its advocacy of his reelection. The rebellion had spent its main force, the Times said, but the government had to face the problem of transferring the South from military to civil rule. No other candidate had avowed a policy. Lincoln presented a plan which opened the way to a complete restoration of the Union on its old basis. He would not, on the one hand, break down state lines or state rights, while, on the other, he would not surrender the control of the southern states to men who, by thought or act, had supported the rebellion. His policy, as enunciated in his Amnesty Proclamation, was read and understood by all men, and approved by most.⁴⁶ Though the Times was staunch in its support of Lincoln's candidacy, it was moderate in its statements concerning the opposition to him. Privately Raymond wrote that "such doctrinaires as Sumner and Phillips" and the "selfish demagogues" who trotted in their wake would ruin the country if they were permitted to influence its action.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Ibid., Aug. 25, 1863. See also issue of Aug. 13, 1863.

⁴⁵ For the Amnesty Proclamation see James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, VI, 213-15.

⁴⁶ Times, Jan. 28, 1864.

⁴⁷ Raymond to J. R. Doolittle, April 30, 1864. Publications of the Southern Historical Association, XI, 100.

Raymond referred particularly to the Radical effort to inject the slavery issue into the campaign. Agitation for constitutional abolition of slavery caused the Times to insist that the slavery problem would solve itself under the President's reconstruction plan. Only loyal men would be admitted to the polls, it argued, and since Union sentiment at the South was also anti-slavery, the simple reestablishment of loyal state governments would decide the whole question of slavery in fact, if not in form. The only states without loyal governments were the unconquered states, and no constitutional amendment could facilitate conquest. That was military work exclusively, but work the very finishing of which would also finish slavery. The practical result of such an amendment, the Times declared, would be to make abolition rather than Union the issue in the campaign and to give the administration's enemies two lines of attack instead of one.⁴⁸ When the Baltimore convention showed a fairly unanimous sentiment among Union men in favor of the abolition amendment, the Times receded from its opposition and declared that the measure was the only solid foundation for reconstruction.⁴⁹ Still striving for moderation, it combatted the next demand of the Radicals, for negro suffrage, with the same vigor that it had at first exhibited against abolition.

Raymond headed the New York delegation to the Baltimore convention. An avowed supporter of Lincoln and the editor of the only New York paper which consistently supported the President, he was popularly regarded as Lincoln's spokesman, though he himself denied the allegation.⁵⁰ Certainly he exerted his influence in the convention in support of the President's policies, and his influence was great, not only as head of the important New York delegation, but as chairman of the committee on resolutions, which prepared the platform.⁵¹ The platform was silent on reconstruction, though its blanket endorsement of the administration, as well as the convention's action in admitting delegates from the

⁴⁸Times, Jan. 21, Feb. 11 and 25, 1864.

⁴⁹Ibid., June 13, and 17, 1864.

⁵⁰Ibid., June 16, 1864.

⁵¹Adam Gurowski, who was in Baltimore, said that Raymond was the "true master" of the convention. Diary, III, 253 (June 10, 1864).

"reconstructed" states and in nominating Andrew Johnson for vice-president, constituted a tacit approval of the President's reconstruction policy. Realization of this fact may have been largely responsible for Raymond's support of Johnson. There seems to be no direct evidence that he was in Lincoln's confidence in regard to the latter's desire to have Johnson nominated, though Alexander K. McClure says that he probably was the closest man to Lincoln in the movement.⁵² Nomination of a War Democrat was in keeping with the policy of nationalizing the Republican party that Raymond had advocated since the very beginning of the war, but certainly there were other War Democrats than Johnson available. Here, however, the factional war among New York Unionists played a part. Whether having definite knowledge of Lincoln's wishes or divining his motives, Raymond maneuvered for the nomination of Johnson.

The New York delegation presented a strong candidate for the vice-presidency in the person of Daniel S. Dickinson, a War Democrat with a good record. Dickinson was unacceptable to the Conservative faction, who feared his nomination would endanger Seward's position in the Cabinet, and Raymond, with the aid of Preston King, succeeded in ruining his candidacy by splitting the delegation. But Johnson's nomination would be impossible unless his availability were assured by the admission of the Tennessee delegation to the convention, a step which the Radicals opposed. A resolution by Thaddeus Stevens forbidding the admission of the delegation from any state that had been in rebellion was referred to the committee on credentials, of which Preston King was chairman. King reported the committee recommendation to seat such delegations without votes, and then moved from the floor to amend the report to give them equal rights with other state delegations. The passage of King's motion assured Johnson's availability. His nomination followed on the first ballot.⁵³

⁵²Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Time, 121. Thirty years later Noah Brooks, a member of the Times' staff, said that the day before the convention Raymond asked him: "Do you know who is Lincoln's choice for Vice-President? I cannot find out." Charles E. Hamlin, The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin, 487.

⁵³Brummer, op. cit., 381 ff; Henry J. Raymond, The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, 55 f; Times, May 15, 1865.

Raymond's closeness to Lincoln and his firm Unionism were recognized by his election as chairman of the Union National Committee. In that capacity he sought by every possible device to insure Lincoln's election. He drew upon himself the maledictions of Gideon Welles by seeking to levy campaign contributions in the navy yards and to turn the patronage of the yards to the support of the President. Although the Times denounced the Niagra Peace Conference as a Democratic electioneering scheme and "all private intermeddling" as "bootless, and intolerably impertinent,"⁵⁴ Raymond, disheartened by the Union apathy during July and August, privately proposed a similar project in the interests of the Union party. He suggested to Lincoln the appointment of a mission to offer peace to the Confederacy on the sole basis of restoration of the Union, all other questions to be settled in a convention of the people of all the states. Although he expected the offer to be rejected, he thought that it would unite public sentiment in favor of the President by dissipating a widespread impression that peace with Union would be possible if the administration were not holding out for the abandonment of slavery.⁵⁵ Lincoln entered into the plan so far as to prepare a draft of instructions to Raymond, directing him to negotiate with Jefferson Davis for peace on the basis proposed. Neither Lincoln nor his Cabinet considered such action advisable, however, and in personal consultation with Raymond they persuaded him to concur with them in that opinion.⁵⁶

The Times sought during the campaign to minimize factional difficulties within the Union party. Upon the veto of the Wade-Davis bill, which asserted that the ultimate authority for restoring the southern states lay in Congress and which prescribed more stringent conditions for restoration than did Lincoln's plan, the paper denied that there was any serious breach between the President and Congress. If restoration were to be a substantial thing, it said, there must be conjoint action between the two branches of government. The plan set forth in the bill was "excellent"; nevertheless it was fortunate that the bill did not receive the President's signature, since it was hardly likely that every state

⁵⁴Ibid., July 22, Aug. 1, 1864.

⁵⁵Raymond to Lincoln, Aug. 22, 1864; John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, IX, 218-19.

⁵⁶Ibid., 218-21.

would require exactly the same process of reconstruction. And it would be a breach of faith to overthrow the work already done in Tennessee and Arkansas.⁵⁷ The attack upon Lincoln in the Wade-Davis Manifesto jarred the Times from its conciliatory tone as had none of the pre-convention machinations of the Radicals. Its authors were actuated by political and personal resentment, the Times charged, at Lincoln's refusal to sanction their plans to exterminate the southern states "in order that they might found upon them a new empire based upon their own ideas, and to be ruled by their counsels." They were determined to free the slaves, seize the lands, and destroy forever the political freedom of the southern people. Lincoln's "invasions of Congressional rights,--his usurpations of Executive power,--would not disturb them if they were practiced on their behalf, and for the furtherance of their schemes."⁵⁸

In October Raymond accepted from the Union Central Committee of the Sixth Congressional District a nomination for congressman. A rival Union General Committee nominated Rush Hawkins. In accepting the nomination, Raymond declared it to be his intention, if elected, to "favor the prompt readmission to the Union of those now in rebellion whenever they shall lay down their arms, and renew their allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States."⁵⁹ He reserved the right, however, to withdraw from the canvass if the harmony of the Union men of the district could thereby be promoted. Repeated efforts of the two factions to agree upon one candidate failed, and the State Central Committee, which had intervened to no avail, finally endorsed Raymond. In addition to Hawkins, Raymond was opposed by both a Mozart and a Tammany Democrat. Although the district was normally Democratic and had given a Tammany majority of 2,000 in 1862, Raymond was elected by a plurality of 386. This personal triumph, blended as it was with the far greater triumph of Lincoln's reelection, which enhanced his prestige as chairman of the Union National Committee, marked the height of Raymond's political career.

⁵⁷Times, July 11, 1864.

⁵⁸Ibid., Aug. 9, 1864.

⁵⁹Raymond's letter of Oct. 21, 1864; Ibid., Oct. 22, 1864.

CHAPTER III
A BASIS FOR RESTORATION

After the cessation of hostilities in the spring of 1865, the Times devoted both its news and editorial columns to the problem of reconstruction. Realizing that accurate knowledge of the condition and temper of the South and its wide dissemination in the North were indispensable to the success of any equitable plan of restoration, the Times sent a competent staff writer, Benjamin C. Truman, upon an extended tour of the rebel states. Truman's letters to the Times comprise one of the fairest accounts that was made of the state of the South during the early months of Reconstruction. With the same regard for the realities of the situation, the Times concerned itself with the broader social and economic implications of reconstruction as well as with the constitutional and political aspects of the subject.

Long before the end of the war, the Times had insisted that a wise and clement civil policy must be adopted with reference to the South if the war were to be terminated without rancorous sequels.¹ Toward the end of February, 1865, with a Union victory only a matter of weeks, the Times proposed a humane and statesman-like policy as a basis for restoration of the Union. The great end and aim of northern policy in dealing with the population of the revolted states, it declared, should be the removal of all traces of the struggle from their memory. Sound policy, as well as humanity and Christianity, demanded that no punishments whatever should be inflicted on anybody, except such as were plainly called for by a prudent regard for the permanence of the post-war settlement. A few leaders might refuse to submit quietly to the authority of the government, but no penal measures would be necessary against the mass of the people.

"There is something puerile," the Times said, "in talking of administering further chastisement for a crime which has already caused the slaughter and maiming of two or three hundred thousand of those engaged in it, and the desolation of almost

¹Times, Jan. 25, 1864.

a third of their territory. With what power can we arm either courts or police that will impress the imagination of men and women like those of the South, who have lived through the horrors of the last four years?"²

It would be necessary of course, the paper continued, to protect the emancipated negroes and northern or loyal inhabitants, and to enforce execution of the judgments of federal courts, but all interference with the ordinary working of local law and the ordinary management of local affairs should be strenuously guarded against. "There are other ways than these which we recommend, of holding conquered territory," the Times concluded; "but there are no other ways of healing the wounds left by civil war."

The Times was as strongly opposed to the infliction of economic as of civil penalties on the South. Surveying the matter broadly, it said, the North was very little out of pocket by the war, since the conflict stimulated commerce and industry and increased wages while its ravages were confined to the South. The national debt, also, was owed almost entirely to northern people. The southern loss, on the other hand, was by a very rough estimate about \$5,800,000,000, including the loss of slave property and of staple crops, the devastation of war, the Confederate debt and the South's share of the national debt. This loss certainly ought to be enough to propitiate the worst enmity.³ It would be to the benefit of both sections, the Times insisted, for them to cooperate in the economic rehabilitation of the South. Northern capital should be furnished for the rebuilding of railroads and bridges; northern skill should assist southern knowledge in the re-formation of a labor system. The result, it believed, would be such industrial progress as the world had never seen before in any country.⁴ But northern capital would not flow southward without certainty of a settled condition of society, which civil safeguards alone could guarantee. Consequently, military government must be terminated as soon as possible.⁵ Pending withdrawal of military forces, the Times urged immediate resumption of trade with southern cities as calculated to enlarge the general prosperity, strengthen the public credit, and create a favorable reaction in the minds of the

²Ibid., Feb. 24, 1865.

³Ibid., June 27, 1865.

⁴Ibid., Jan. 20, June 20, 1865.

⁵Ibid., Nov. 23, 1865.

southern people.⁶

The position of the Times upon economic and financial matters seems to have been taken in the interests of commerce and banking rather than of industry. This was entirely natural in a paper dependent for its very existence upon the continued prosperity of a commercial center such as New York. More directly, the Times drew much of its advertising, the volume of which determines a paper's profit or loss, from banking and commercial houses. The Times' attitude upon the national debt, currency questions, and the tariff was such as would be expected from these facts.

The Times believed that the most pressing task before the Secretary of the Treasury was accomplishment of a return to the specie basis, "without unnecessary delay, and yet without inflicting serious shocks upon the business of the country."⁷ It quoted with approval Secretary McCulloch's remark that a "departure from the specie standard, (although for the time being a necessity,) is not less damaging and demoralizing to the public than expensive to the government."⁸ But resumption could only come, the Times held, when an excess of income over expenses made it possible for the government to curtail the currency by retiring greenbacks. The consequent fall in the price level would cause an increase in exports, and the favorable balance of trade thus created would increase the stock of specie in this country sufficiently to warrant resumption. The whole matter was thus self-regulatory and independent of policy except insofar as it depended upon a reduction of governmental expenditures.⁹ The treasury's policy toward the national debt should be shaped by these considerations and by a regard for the general prosperity of the country. Neither national credit nor future prosperity required that the debt should be met by the present generation, and equity forbid it. The main burden of the debt should devolve upon the next two or three generations, and the country's money should be devoted to developing its resources. McCulloch's early operations by which short term treasury notes and certificates were converted into long term bonds thus were doubly satisfactory, since they combined funding and contraction in one process.¹⁰

⁶Ibid., April 8, June 15, 1865.

⁷Ibid., March 11, 1865.

⁸Ibid., July 8, 1865.

⁹Ibid., May 2, 1865.

¹⁰Ibid., May 11, Oct. 3, 1865.

In the opinion of the Times, the high war tariffs constituted undesirable restrictions upon the expansion of trade, and consequently, upon the general prosperity of the country. Avoiding argument on the abstract merits or demerits of protection, the paper based its demand for a lower tariff on the need for greater revenue with which to meet the national debt. While assuring manufacturers that the revenue needs of the country would insure a tariff sufficiently high to afford reasonable protection, it warned them that manufacturing establishments in every village would profit the government little if it found itself bankrupt.¹¹ Although there is no direct evidence that southern low tariff sentiment influenced the Times in its advocacy of a speedy restoration of the southern states to the Union, the connection is too obvious to be ignored.¹²

Apart from any ulterior motive, the Times' position in regard to the restoration of the rebel states was the logical outgrowth of the constitutional theory that it had consistently maintained. Refusing to concede a constitutional right of secession, it chose to deny the fact of secession. Since the war had been fought and won solely to preserve the Union, the theory that the southern states were out of the Union and would have to be readmitted was ridiculous as well as unconstitutional. Under the Constitution, the Times said, rebellion could only be a personal crime, cognizance of which could be taken by the federal government only as committed by individuals. To hold a state guilty of rebellion was to embrace Calhoun's doctrine. The Times would not even admit the intellectual integrity of men who advanced this theory, charging that its sole basis was their desire to force their ideas, first of emancipation and then of negro equality, upon the South.¹³ The Times agreed perforce, however, with Lincoln's statement that the southern states were out of their proper practical relations with the Union. Those "proper practical relations" were equal relations, it said, for it would be ruinous to the constitutional system to pervert it by keeping one section of the country permanently subordinate to the rest.¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid., Dec. 13, 1864; July 14 and 20, 1865.

¹² See Howard K. Beale, The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 116.

¹³ Times, May 30, 1864; Jan. 19, Feb. 6, 1865.

¹⁴ Ibid., April 13, 1865.

Before the southern states should be restored to a position of equality within the Union, the Times declared, justice and security demanded that certain safeguards and punitive measures should be instituted. General justice required the punishment of the rebel leaders. Governmental security necessitated the disfranchisement and debarring from office of all who would not swear fidelity to the national government. Justice to the race demanded that slavery should be utterly destroyed, and that the freedmen should be secured from all further oppression by means of civil safeguards and public instruction.¹⁵

While advocating civil equality for the negro, the Times was outspoken in its opposition to negro suffrage as an issue entirely extraneous to reconstruction. The whole problem of reconstruction, it declared, could be settled without touching the suffrage question. But since negro suffrage had become an issue that was fast creating a new sectionalism, the Times proposed as a compromise to which it believed the Union men of the South would agree, that the suffrage should be extended by constitutional amendment to all men who could read, regardless of color.¹⁶ Unrestricted suffrage it opposed as socially undesirable and as constitutionally impossible. Indeed, it was democracy run mad, the Times said, for it was the open and shameless proclamation of the doctrine that nothing was necessary to constitute a citizen beyond "a mouth, a stomach, and a pair of legs." Pointing out that one of the strongest arguments against slavery had been the degradation and ignorance into which it had plunged the southern negro, the Times declared that the demand for negro suffrage could come from no party with a worse grace than from that which for fifty years had filled the world with pictures of the horrible consequences to the nation of enforcing ignorance by law.¹⁷ Unrestricted negro suffrage was not constitutionally possible because it was not a subject for federal action under the Constitution and the necessary majority of states, north or south, could not be gained for a constitutional amendment. Although the doctrine of state sovereignty had been exploded, the principle of states rights was still valid and ought to be respected.¹⁸

¹⁵Ibid., May 5, 1865.

¹⁶Ibid., Jan. 4, Dec. 29, 1864; June 19 and 21, 1865.

¹⁷Ibid., June 8, 1864.

¹⁸Ibid., May 18, 1864; J1.7, 1865.

In opposing negro suffrage the Times was, of course, also opposing the Radical plan to control the South through the enfranchised negro. But the Times' variance with the Radicals on this question was not so much a disagreement relative to the end to be reached as to the means to be employed and the political group that should be dominant. Rather than a black Republican party at the South, dominated by a Radical-industrialist group, the Times hoped for the formation of a white Union party in alliance, presumably, with the moderate-commercial element at the North.¹⁹ Early in the war it had declared the conflict to be a class war, and had stated that the true northern policy was to introduce a wedge between the people and the aristocracy of the South.²⁰ Now, in the summer of 1865, it commended Johnson's policy as calculated to build up a new and loyal class from the poor whites and middle class at the expense of the slaveholders who, as a class, should be ground to powder. To this end it heartily approved Johnson's Amnesty Proclamation, regretting only the the President should have seen fit not to include southern editors and clergymen in the excepted classes. Johnson's policy of selecting, so far as possible, loyal southern men for southern offices it found wise, and it urged that the test of loyalty should be not what men had been but what they then were. A distinction should be drawn between active and passive secessionists and Johnson, better than any other man, knew where to draw the line.²¹

The demands of what the Times deemed to be abstract justice reënforced the requirements of practical politics. The paper proposed to make the southern leaders the scapegoats of the rebellion by laying on their heads all the sins and follies of the South. The rebel chiefs, it said, were not at all identified with the South of the present and the future, and though the past had been forgotten in relation to the body of the southern people, it could never be forgotten in relation to their leaders.²² The Times demanded, in particular, the punishment of those responsible for the treatment of northern prisoners. In this connection it singled out Jefferson Davis as the arch criminal, though it also held Lee

¹⁹ Ibid., June 26, 1866. ²⁰ Ibid., May 1, 1862.

²¹ Ibid., April 29, May 30 and 31, June 9 and 26, July 10, 1865.

²² Ibid., July 28, 1865.

and the Confederate secretaries of war accountable. If Davis were let to go unchanged, it declared in April, hanging must in decency be abolished altogether. To let him go unpunished would be not so much an amnesty for the past as a plenary indulgence for future treason.²³ As the difficulties in the way of Davis' conviction became apparent, the Times' position became more moderate. By September it was ready to declare that, since the Constitution would be vindicated and the supremacy of the national authority forever established by Davis' conviction, public policy might well allow his pardon should he be convicted. It still pressed, however, for a trial and conviction.²⁴

Though the Times held that reconstruction, as a practical matter, lay in the actual refilling of the vacant chairs in Congress, and hence was subject to the exercise of the constitutional right of Congress to pronounce upon the qualifications of its members, it supported the President's assumption of the right to set up machinery for the restoration of loyal governments in the seceded states by executive order.²⁵ President Johnson was governed in his actions solely by the Constitution, the paper asserted, and the great mass of the people would sustain his policy.²⁶ The Times found the policies and actions of the provisional governors whom Johnson had appointed to be good and applauded the work of the southern state conventions. It was clearly the hope of the paper that the work of reconstruction would have progressed so far before Congress convened that that body would hesitate to disrupt it.²⁷ This very hope was evidence of the lack of harmony in the Union party, in spite of the Times' constant assertions that all was well and that the closest cooperation would prevail between the executive and legislative branches of the government. But intimations of the impending struggle crept into the columns of the Times even though the paper chose to assume an air of optimism. On one occasion it stated baldly that if Johnson's program were put to the test of a presidential election, it would be most fiercely contested by powerful parties both in the North and South.²⁸ It

²³Ibid., April 12 and 22, May 23, 1865.

²⁴Ibid., Sept. 4, 1865. ²⁵Ibid., July 19, 1865.

²⁶Ibid., Sept. 13, 1865.

²⁷Ibid., Aug. 14, Sept. 19, 1865.

²⁸Ibid., Aug. 15, 1865.

believed, however, that with no campaign imminent, the President, supported by a majority of the people, would be able to control his party and Congress.

Raymond had not arrived at the conclusions expressed in the Times without personal contact with Johnson. At least once during the summer he had held a long conversation with the President, in which the latter had outlined a clearly defined policy and one that met with his approval. He was particularly pleased with Johnson's opposition to universal negro suffrage, while on "general questions" he found the President "firm and perfectly trustworthy." Even more satisfactory to Raymond was Johnson's opinion that the Union party should take the lead in the work of restoration. The President laughed, wrote Raymond, "at the notion that he could be captured by the Democrats."²⁹ It is reasonably certain that the topic of the President's relations with the Democratic party was introduced by Raymond, for it was a subject to which the editor attached the greatest importance. He stated on another occasion that he never failed, in his infrequent conversations with Johnson during the winter of 1865-1866, to allude to the fear that the President "was going over to the Democratic party, in which as a political organization the country had lost confidence."³⁰

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Times, while attempting to consolidate the opinion of all Union men in support of the President, should have gone to great lengths in its efforts to dissociate him from the Democrats in the public mind. This policy apparently resulted from a sincere belief on Raymond's part that the defeatist element at the North ought to retire from politics in favor of the men who had saved the Union, and from his fear that the adherence of the erstwhile Copperheads to the President and his program would alienate loyal men. There were also important local political considerations. If Johnson accepted the support of the New York Democrats, federal patronage would be diverted to them at the expense of the Conservative wing of the Union party. Thus Raymond's position in the Times was taken in the interests of the

²⁹Raymond to Weed, Barnes, Memoir of Weed, 451. This letter is quoted at length, but no date is given. From the context, it apparently was written in the summer of 1865.

³⁰Raymond to Greeley, n. d., in the Times, Sept. 15, 1866.

New York Conservatives, whose claims were being vigorously pressed upon the President by Thurlow Weed and Preston King, supported, presumably, by Seward in the Cabinet. Montgomery Blair, on the other hand, urged Johnson to drop Seward and to build up Democratic support in New York by a discreet use of the patronage.³¹

In spite of any objections Johnson might have had to being identified with the Democracy, that party was anxious to join forces with him. Attracted by the moderation of his reconstruction policy, the New York Democrats, in convention at Albany, September 6 and 7, 1865, ignored their war-time leaders and voted to support the President.³² As a further bid for loyal support, certain Republicans were placed on the Democratic ticket. The Times remarked that the resolutions adopted would scarcely be voted down in the Republican convention, which was to meet in Syracuse on September 20. This surrender to the Unionists and Republicans would defeat the Democratic ticket, it said, for the mass of Democrats would see that logic demanded support of the Union candidates.³³ Radicals apparently were numerically predominant in the Union convention, but Weed, through his friendship with Preston King, who had been appointed collector of the port of New York, was thought to have control of the patronage, and he and Raymond controlled the convention. The latter succeeded in preventing adoption of a resolution, advocated by Greeley, in favor of negro suffrage, which would have thrown the President into the arms of the Democrats.³⁴ The convention also refused to coöperate

³¹M. Blair to Johnson, June 16, 1865, Johnson MSS, Vol. 67, No. 4515; S. M. L. Barlow to M. Blair, Sept. 11, 1865, ibid., Vol. 76, No. 6731; William E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics, II, 344-46. Blair's activities caused the Times, July 15, 1865, to remark, in one of its rare personalities, that "the Blair family, now that slavery is abolished, is the most 'peculiar institution' of this country."

³²Homer Adolph Stebbins, A Political History of the State of New York, 1865-1869. "Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law" LV, No. 1, 48-50; Alexander, Political History of New York, III, 128.

³³Times, Sept. 8, 1865.

³⁴Stebbins, op. cit., 55-63; Alexander, op. cit., III, 129-33.

with the Democrats in the matter of a fusion ticket and rejected the Republicans whom they had nominated.³⁵

In spite of all rebuffs, the Democrats persisted in their support of the President. For different, but obvious reasons, Greeley in the Tribune and Manton Marble in the World declared that their support was acceptable to Johnson and that he had intimated his desire for a Democratic victory in New York. This the Times categorically denied. "We know," the paper asserted, that President Johnson would feel the failure of the Union ticket "to be a great misfortune to the country and to his Administration."³⁶ Attacking the Democrats from another angle, the Times questioned the sincerity of their proffered support and sought to emphasize minor differences between the Democratic and presidential positions on reconstruction.³⁷ But the Democrats would neither be silenced nor forced into opposition to Johnson. Their support continued to embarrass the administration and was eventually to prove the entering wedge between Raymond and the President.

³⁵Times, Sept. 22, 1865. ³⁶Ibid., Oct. 14, 1865.

³⁷Ibid., Oct. 16, Nov. 6, 1865.

CHAPTER IV
SPOKESMAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION

As the time neared for Congress to convene, the Times resolutely maintained its optimism in regard to the relations that would subsist between the President and Congress. It took the National Intelligencer to task for remarking that the time had come for all members of the Union party to "range themselves fairly and squarely under their banners." The Times would not concur in the justice of the assumption that there was such a difference of sentiment in the party as to render a division into hostile factions expedient and necessary. While differences of opinion did exist, there was no reason to doubt that they would be harmonized, and that the party in Congress would cordially support the administration. If we are mistaken, the Times continued, "we shall find it out in due season; and nothing is to be gained meantime in forcing the issue prematurely upon Congress or the country."¹ Yet Raymond was under no illusions regarding the temper of the Radicals, for he had written to Weed during the summer that they were "outwardly smooth and anxious for peace and union, but only (at bottom) on their own terms."² His hope apparently was that a show of reasonableness on the part of the administration would isolate the Radicals by attracting moderate support from them.

The first question with which Congress would have to deal would be the admission of southern representatives. Apparently with the hope of achieving the party harmony which it had repeatedly declared to exist, the Times approached the Radical position on the question, though, in view of its past record, consistency seemed to require that it insist upon prompt readmission of the delegations from the seceded states. The intention of Edward McPherson, clerk of the House of Representatives, to omit from the roll of the House the names of southern members had been publicized by George T. Curtis in a speech in Brooklyn early in November.

¹Times, Nov. 24, 1865.

²Quoted in Barnes, Memoir of Weed, 451.

Curtis said that this was the "culminating point" on which the question of reconstruction would turn and intimated that such action on McPherson's part would be unconstitutional. The Times merely commented that though the matter was important, it was far less vital than Curtis represented it to be.³ In an editorial of December 1, 1865, the Times reprimanded the southern congressmen-elect for their "precipitate eagerness" to gain their seats, and declared that every consideration of policy and prudence urged postponement of a decision upon their claims "until after, and long after," the organization of the House. It would be most excellent discipline for those men to be made to sit for awhile "on the lobby stools of repentance."

At a caucus of the Union members of Congress on December 2, Thaddeus Stevens moved that a committee of seven be appointed to report resolutions to the caucus. The committee, of which Stevens was chairman and Raymond a member, proposed a resolution calling for the appointment of a joint committee of fifteen members of the House and Senate to inquire into the condition of the seceded states and to report whether all or any of them were entitled to representation in either house. The committee was to have leave to report at any time. Until its report should be made and acted upon, no member from a rebel state should be received into either house of Congress. The caucus unanimously adopted the report and instructed Stevens to introduce the resolution on the first day of the session.⁴ The House adopted the resolution on December 4, Raymond's vote being cast in the affirmative. The Senate, however, amended it by striking out the clause forbidding admission of southern members until the Joint Committee of Fifteen should have reported, and the House, on the motion of Stevens, concurred in the amendment.

Raymond told Louis Jennings, immediately after the caucus of December 2, that the resolution creating the Joint Committee of

³Times, Nov. 8, 1865. Curtis said that the Act of March 3, 1863, instructed the clerk to make a roll of persons whose credentials showed that they had been regularly elected. He argued that the clerk could not go back of the face of the credentials because of the constitutional clause making each house the sole judge of the qualifications of its members.

⁴Ibid., Dec. 4, 1865.

Fifteen had been proposed by Stevens without explanation or discussion of any kind and that it had been put hastily to the vote. He said that he had voted for it with the rest without at the moment perceiving the consequences to which it would lead.⁵ It is possible that this explanation is the true one, and that Raymond was taken in by Stevens. On the other hand, Raymond, though new to Congress, was no political novice, and it is hard to believe that with his long and successful experience in New York politics he could have been unaware of the implications of the resolution.⁶ Taken with the Times' editorial of December 1 on the admission of southern congressmen, Raymond's vote on the resolution would seem to indicate that he hoped to win moderate support for the administration by an irenic attitude. Whether his vote was due to political naïveté or to policy, he was credited by Conservatives such as Gideon Welles with having "gone off" with Stevens and the Radicals.⁷ In view of his subsequent criticism of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, the incident went far to establish his reputation as a "trimmer."

Whatever the cause of his action, Raymond was not long in realizing his error. A few days after the caucus of December 2, he invited a number of representatives with whom he hoped to act to a consultation at his house. Jennings, who was present at most of the conference, says that a great divergence of opinion was developed during the discussion. Raymond, arguing that the southern states had never been out of the Union, advocated their restoration to their former political privileges as soon as they should give proper guaranties of their loyalty. Some of the conferees

⁵Louis J. Jennings, "Mr. Raymond and Journalism," in the Galaxy, IX, 469-70. Jennings, who was editor of the Times for a short time after Raymond's death, was correspondent for the London Times in 1865-1866, and resided with Raymond in the house which the latter had taken on "I" Street for his term in Congress.

⁶Benjamin B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 151, says that the Evening Post, Sun, Herald, and Commercial Advertiser all opposed appointment of a joint committee, "fearing that it would act altogether in a spirit of partisanship and cause unnecessary delay in settling the question of reconstruction."

⁷Welles, Diary, II, 406 (Dec. 29, 1865).

were for measures very similar to those that were afterward adopted, while others were for keeping the states out of the Union indefinitely. All except one, however, were agreed that Tennessee should be restored to representation at once, provided its representatives could take the oath.⁸ When during the second week of the session Raymond presented the credentials of the Tennessee delegation, Thaddeus Stevens arose and declared that there was no such state as Tennessee known to Congress.

In deference to "certain members" of the House, Raymond moved to refer the credentials of the members-elect from Tennessee to the Joint Committee of Fifteen, though he stated that personally he would prefer to refer them to the committee on elections.⁹ The persistence of these "certain members" in seeking their own ends was demonstrated on December 14, when James F. Wilson, of Iowa, introduced a resolution which, in effect, would have nullified the Senate amendment to Steven's resolution of December 4 by forbidding admission of southern members until Congress should declare the state from which they came entitled to representation. The House's passage of the resolution, against which Raymond voted, aroused the apprehension of the Times.¹⁰ If Raymond had any lingering hope that the Radicals might be reasonable, it was entirely dispelled by Steven's speech of December 18, in which he served notice that southerners would not be readmitted to Congress until the supremacy of the Republican party were assured.

Whether the southern states were actually out of the Union and mere conquered territory, Stevens said, or whether they retained the qualities of states within the Union--in which case they were mere dead carcasses--it required the action of Congress to readmit them or to breathe life into them.¹¹ Believing that

⁸Galaxy, IX, 470. Jennings does not give the names of those participating in the conference but it appears from the context that it was Stevens who opposed admission of Tennessee.

⁹National Intelligencer, Dec. 13, 1865.

¹⁰House Journal, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 72; Times, Dec. 16, 1865.

¹¹Stevens found the constitutional sanction for the former case in the clause authorizing Congress to admit new states into the Union; for the latter, in the clause guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government.

actual facts warranted the former interpretation, Stevens advocated that the southern states be given the status of territories, with a consequent right to Congress of prescribing suffrage qualifications. In either case, neither house could admit southern members until after Congress had reconstituted the southern states. Then each house might exercise its constitutional privilege of deciding upon the qualifications of its members. In order to insure the perpetual ascendancy of the Republican party, Stevens proposed constitutional amendments to change the basis of representation from federal numbers to actual voters; to lay an export duty on cotton; and to furnish the freedmen with homesteads and hedge them about with protective laws. There were two vital principles, he said, which must be established in connection with his proposals. None of the rebel states must be allowed to participate in amending the Constitution until they had been "duly admitted into the family of States by the law-making power of their conqueror." And it must be solemnly decided "what power" could "revive, recreate, and reinstate these provinces into the family of States, and invest them with the right of American citizens."¹²

Thus the old Commoner marked out the line of battle. His speech constituted a challenge to the administration that could not be ignored. As it was desirable that the effect of his remarks should be counteracted before Congress adjourned for the Christmas recess, Raymond was selected to make an immediate reply. There were several reasons why the duty should have fallen upon Raymond, new though he was to Congress. He was chairman of the Union National Committee; he was editor of a metropolitan daily that had loyally supported Johnson as the executor of Lincoln's political will; and he was a fluent and effective speaker. The administration's choice was circumscribed, too, by the limited number of its avowed adherents among the Republicans in the House. While there were many men passive in their attitude toward both Radicals and administration, there were few, apart from Democrats, who actively supported Johnson. Probably Seward or Weed was responsible for the selection of Raymond to speak for the administration.¹³

¹²Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 72-74.

¹³Welles charged that the task was self-assumed by Raymond at the instance of Seward, who let it be known that the former was the "organ" of the President. Diary, III, 191 (Aug. 31, 1867).

for Raymond himself apparently was not intimate with Johnson. We have his own word for it that he "conversed freely though not frequently" with the President upon the action of the Union party in Congress during the winter of 1865-1866,¹⁴ and there is not a single letter of his in all of Johnson's voluminous correspondence during the summer and fall of 1865. In fact, though Raymond was commonly regarded as the spokesman of the administration in the House during the winter, Gideon Welles probably was right when he declared that the President "really had no organ or confidential friend in the House, no confidant who spoke for him and his policy among the Representatives."¹⁵

Raymond spoke on December 21. Before he could gain the floor he was forestalled by William E. Finck, of Ohio, a Democrat of the Vallandigham school, who anticipated the ground that he was to take. Raymond's appeal was for Republican support, and for the Democrats to take the lead in the defence of Johnson's policy was the last thing that the administration desired. In the hope of undoing the mischief that Finck had done, Raymond prefaced his speech with a sharp rebuke to him as a representative of the anti-war party. Such concern for the preservation of the Union as Finck had expressed, he said, if shown while the war was raging, might have prevented rivers of blood and tears and saved the country millions of dollars. But he could not help feeling that these expressions of a purpose to support a loyal administration of the government could not then be of as much benefit to the country as they might once have been. The tone and manner with which Raymond spoke, as well as the substance of his remarks, conveyed distinct notice to the Democrats that their support was not wanted.¹⁶

Turning his attention to the main purpose of his speech, Raymond sought to refute Stevens' conquered province theory. If the states were, or ever had been, out of the Union, he said, it was by some specific act. But by what act? Not by an ordinance of secession passed by any state of the Union, for such an ordinance was simply a nullity because it encountered in its practical

¹⁴Raymond to Horace Greeley, n. d., in the Times, Sept. 15, 1866.

¹⁵Welles, Diary, III, 192 (Aug. 31, 1867).

¹⁶See James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, II, 130-32. Raymond's speech is in Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 120-23.

operation the Constitution of the United States, which was the supreme law of the land. Nor was it by any resolutions of the state legislatures or by declarations of their officials, all of which utterances were merely expressions of a purpose to secede. The only way in which this declared purpose could have been made effective was by war. But since they failed to maintain their purpose by force of arms, they failed to secede. As proof that, instead of seceding, the states had only interrupted for a time the practical enforcement and exercise of the jurisdiction of the Constitution, Raymond pointed to the fact that for four years Congress had continued to make laws for the "seceded" states and to raise armies to enforce those laws, in which actions Stevens had participated.

To Stevens' assertion that the states had forfeited their existence as states by the act of rebellion, Raymond replied that no state had rebelled. Only individual citizens of states went into the rebellion and thereby incurred certain penalties under the laws and Constitution of the United States. What the states did was to endeavor to interpose their state authority between the individuals in rebellion and the government of the United States, which assumed to declare those individuals traitors for their acts. He knew of nothing in the Constitution, he said, or in any recognized or established code of international law, that rendered a state liable to punishment for any act it might perform.

Raymond was careful to point out that Stevens' position, if followed to its logical conclusions, would force acceptance of the doctrine of state sovereignty and of the right of a state to withdraw from the Union at will. It would mean that the United States had been waging war with an independent nation and that there could be no talk of treason in connection with the recent conflict, or of loyal men at the South since the war. It would mean that the United States must pay the Confederate debts, for if the Confederacy were an independent power, it had the right to contract debts, and the United States, having overthrown and conquered that independent power, would inherit its debts and assets.

The conquest that had been achieved, Raymond asserted, was a conquest over the rebellion, not a conquest over the states whose authority the rebellion had subverted. On the surrender which this conquest involved, he would base the right to demand certain guaranties for the future. The principle of state sov-

ereignty must be given up and the ordinances in which it was expressed must be declared null and void. Slavery must be abolished and the Confederate debt must be repudiated. These guaranties must be embodied in the several state constitutions. Here, John A. Bingham, of Ohio, interrupted with questions designed to show that guaranties in state constitutions were worthless, since they could be repealed. To his insistence that all guaranties must be incorporated in the federal Constitution, Raymond replied that he would support a "proper" amendment to the Constitution.

The President had already demanded the necessary guaranties, Raymond said, by virtue of his lawful authority as commander-in-chief of the United States army, and for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion. Asked if there was any limit to the right to make these requisitions except the good judgment of Congress, Raymond stoutly asserted that there was. The requisitions were made as a part of the terms of surrender, he said, and the President, as commander-in-chief, had the right to make them and to fix the limits that they should embrace.

Even in this first speech of Raymond's the Radicals showed little disposition to give him a hearing. Though they repeatedly interrupted and questioned him in a manner that verged on the truculent, he bore himself well. He spoke in a conciliatory way, as though seeking to avoid any unpleasantness, but he showed his determination to maintain his essential position. The Times was fully justified in the discreet praise that it bestowed on the forensic efforts of its editor, but its calculated optimism carried it far when it declared that there was no longer any uneasiness that Congress would find any essential grounds of dissent from the President's "cautious, tentative, liberal policy of restoration."¹⁷

The confidence of the Times was short-lived. Soon after the holidays, Samuel Shellabarger, of Ohio, replied specifically to Raymond's speech. It was his intention, Shellabarger declared, to show that there could be, under the Constitution, none of the rights or powers of a state where there was recognized none of the obligations or duties of a state. To Raymond's demand for the specific act which caused the southern states to lose their status as states, Shellabarger replied that it was that specific act

¹⁷Times, Dec. 23, 1865.

which turned their citizens into traitors and deprived them of loyal governments. The destruction of all loyal government and law in the southern states was a fact, he declared, not a law, and it was this fearful fact, rather than any ordinances of secession, that made them cease to be states.¹⁸

A test of the relative effectiveness of the two men's arguments was at hand in the pending vote on resolutions introduced by Daniel W. Voorhees, an Indiana Democrat, which endorsed Johnson's reconstruction policy, denied Stevens' conquered province theory, and thanked Johnson for his "wise and successful efforts" to restore law and order in the rebel states. Bingham moved a substitute resolution declaring the abiding confidence of Congress in the President's disposition to cooperate with that body in restoring the states. Upon acceptance of the substitute by the House, Bingham moved to refer the resolution to the Joint Committee of Fifteen. Of the Republicans, only Raymond and a New York colleague, William A. Darling, voted against referring the resolution. The fact that Voorhees had been an anti-war Democrat might have been sufficient reason for a majority of the House to reject his resolutions in favor of Bingham's substitute. But reference of the substitute resolution to the Joint Committee of Fifteen was a virtual refusal by a House preponderantly Republican to endorse, even while it subtly reprimanded, the Republican administration.¹⁹ It was also an emphatic and unmistakable rejection of Raymond's leadership.

To the ever-increasing evidence of the determination of Congress to take the work of reconstruction into its own hands, the Times countered with the assertion that the work was already done. Congress might question the authority of the President to do all that he had done, it said, but it was done and there was no way, short of another war, to undo it. The only thing left to complete restoration of the seceded states to their old practical relations with the national government was admission of their

¹⁸Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 143 ff (Jan. 8, 1866).

¹⁹House Journal, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 125; Blaine, op. cit., 136-39. Rhodes says that until the veto of the Freedmen's Bureau bill, Feb. 19, 1866, the majority of Republican senators and representatives were nearer to the President's view than to that of Sumner or Stevens. History of the United States, VI, 39.

representatives and senators to Congress. This, the Times admitted, was at the discretion of Congress.²⁰ But it urged the immediate admission of all southerners who presented proper credentials.

In the hope of effecting immediate admission of the southern congressmen, Raymond opened fire upon the Joint Committee of Fifteen, which he believed was deliberately retarding the matter. On January 12, he secured the passage of a resolution calling upon the President to submit to the House all information in his possession tending to throw light on the political condition of the southern states.²¹ This was intended to force the Joint Committee of Fifteen to accept from Johnson information relative to the South, which it had refused.²² When the resolution failed in its purpose of preventing the committee from taking testimony on conditions in the South, Raymond openly attacked the committee. It had recently reported the first of what was evidently to be a series of proposed constitutional amendments, and Raymond took this action for his particular target.²³ He objected to the amendment on several grounds, he said, but especially because the committee was withholding the entire program on which it proposed to reconstruct the government. Congress had a right to know what this program was before acting upon any part of it. He could only apprehend the worst when the committee into whose hands Congress had abdicated its functions and power, shut its doors against its creator, and deliberating in secret, issued from time to time decrees for Congress to ratify or reject. The members of Congress owed it to themselves to emancipate themselves from the domination of that committee. They owed it to themselves to discharge the

²⁰Times, Jan. 9 and 19, 1866. See also issue of Dec. 25, 1865.

²¹Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 214.

²²New York Herald, Jan. 13 and 19, 1866.

²³The proposed amendment, reported by Stevens, January 31, 1866, provided that whenever the elective franchise should be denied or abridged in any state on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color should be excluded from the basis of representation. The House passed the amendment, Raymond voting "nay," but the Senate rejected it. Edward McPherson, A Political Manual for 1866 and 1867, 104-105.

committee from further consideration of the subjects that had been assigned to it and to take them back into their own keeping, where the Constitution had placed them.

Raymond proceeded to outline the program that Congress ought to follow after discharging the Joint Committee of Fifteen. To treat the South in any other way than as an integral part of the republic, he warned, would be to convert the government into a despotism and to justify the rebellion. Congress should accept the present status of the southern states and regard them as having resumed, under the President's guidance and action, their functions of self-government within the Union. The House should decide on the admission of representatives by districts, admitting none but loyal men, while the Senate should act in the same way in regard to the representatives of the states. The civil rights of the freedmen should be fully protected by federal law, leading actors in the rebellion should be excluded from federal office, and measures should be taken by the disposition of military forces to preserve order and to prevent the overthrow of the republican form of government in any state. Such of these measures as might seem wise to Congress and the states, "acting freely and without coercion," should be incorporated in constitutional amendments.²⁴

Though Raymond had excoriated Radical procedure in the Joint Committee of Fifteen, his program showed a disposition to come to an accommodation with the Radicals in the matter of guaranties. The omission of negro suffrage from the program was notable, however, and especially so as Raymond had recently voted for unrestricted suffrage in the District of Columbia. The story of that vote is illustrative of the partisan difficulties that beset him and other Conservatives. The Republican caucus had voted two to one for limited suffrage in the District and had expected the bill to be recommitted to the judiciary committee for the desired amendments. Wilson, of Iowa, chairman of the committee, and his Radical associates, voted with the Democrats, who hoped to split the Republicans, against recommitting the bill. The Conservative Republicans then voted for the bill in its extreme form rather than give the Democrats the satisfaction of having caused a split.²⁵ Raymond's vote added nothing to his

²⁴Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 483-92 (Jan. 29, 1866).

²⁵Times, Jan. 22, 1866; Herald, Jan. 28, 1866. Only a

reputation for consistency.

Of a similar nature was Raymond's record on the Freedmen's Bureau bill. He gave the bill his unqualified support and voted for it when it passed the House.²⁶ He was not called upon to reverse his vote after Johnson vetoed the measure, since the Senate's action in sustaining the veto made a House vote unnecessary, but there is no doubt that he would have done so if the need had arisen. In fact, he participated in the great mass meeting that was held at Cooper's Institute on February 22 for the purpose of endorsing the veto and defended Johnson's action at some length. If the constitutional rights of the southern states were overridden under the pretext of punishing the rebels, he warned, it might not be long before northern states also would feel the pressure of centralization.²⁷ The Times endorsed Johnson's message in extravagant terms, declaring that no similar document "ever so directly, so conclusively, so completely commended itself to the heart and brains of the nation." The country was unequivocally on the side of the President as against the Radicals, it said, and it was not difficult to prognosticate where the victory would rest in the contest between them.²⁸

In this declaration the Times was merely repeating what it had time and again asserted to be true, that an appeal to the people would find them solidly with the President.²⁹ In support of such assertions, the paper published columns of excerpts from letters to the editor endorsing Johnson's policy. The letters published, it said, were only a small fraction of the correspondence received during the preceding three months, all of which was of the same tenor.³⁰ But while Raymond the editor was receiving commendatory correspondence, Raymond the congressman was being

few days before, the Times, Jan. 16, 1866, had declared that the demand for political equality for the negro was "the rock upon which we shall split, that is, if Messrs. Chase, Stevens, Sumner, &c., &c., persist in their schemes of running this 'machine.'" ²⁶

²⁶ Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 655; Times, Feb. 6, 1866.

²⁷ Maverick, Raymond, 174-84; Times, Feb. 23, 1866. Seward and Dennison also spoke.

²⁸ Ibid., Feb. 22, 1866.

²⁹ Ibid., Dec. 29, 1865; Jan. 5, Feb. 14, 1866.

³⁰ Ibid., March 16, 1866.

bombarded with letters from angry constituents, "everyone of which contained a sting." The tone of some of those letters might have been justified, Louis Jennings says, if Raymond had proved as great an enemy to his country as any of the leaders of secession against whom Thaddeus Stevens thundered.³¹

Not the least cause of Raymond's failure to develop a following in the House was the withering sarcasm of which the Pennsylvanian made him the target. Though there subsisted between the two men an odd sort of friendship, as of enemies fraternizing in the interludes of battle, quarter was neither asked nor given in the political conflict.³² In serious discourse Stevens leveled against Raymond all the force of the burning invective of which he was peculiarly the master,³³ while in the casual give and take of parliamentary debate his sarcastic jibes kept the New Yorker ever before the House as a creature so faintly endowed with the qualities of leadership that he could not even steer himself a straight course. Though Raymond was no match for the Radical leader, he stood up to him in the House to the best of his not inconsiderable ability, and the Times attacked him vigorously. The worst enemies of the Union party were in its own household, the paper declared with reference to Stevens and his Radical friends. If their assaults upon the Constitution and the executive were to continue, the Union would be in greater danger from the doings of professed friends than from the machinations of its most malignant enemies.³⁴

This feeling that the Radicals did not represent the true sentiment of the Union party, in Congress or out, caused the Times to welcome Johnson's denunciation of Radical leaders in his ill-advised outburst of February 22.³⁵ The report that the President

³¹Galaxy, IX, 470-71.

³²Ibid., 471-72.

³³When Raymond praised the courage on both sides during the war as the common glory of the nation, Stevens rebuked him, saying that if the ghostly spirits of the dead could have heard him, "they would have broken the cerements of the tomb and stalked forth and haunted him until his eyeballs were seared." Ibid., 469.

³⁴Times, Feb. 2, 1866. See also issue of April 5, 1866.

³⁵The press in general almost unanimously condemned the speech. Rhodes, History of the United States, VI, 62. The New York Herald, however, was with the Times in its approval. Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot, 345.

had broken with his party was carried to New York that night by telegraph and soon spread over the city. Though the Times published a full telegraphic report of the speech the next morning, it had time for only the briefest editorial comment, which was explanatory rather than critical in nature. The President had for some time ceased to regard the men whom he had named "as in any sense representatives of members of the Union party," it said; he believed them to be, in principle and purpose, disunionists, and had treated them accordingly in his remarks. On the twenty-fourth the Times gave its carefully considered opinion that Johnson's denunciation of Stevens, Sumner, and Phillips for resisting the work of reconstruction was as great as it was severe, while his entire speech was a "great effort of wisdom and patriotism." The Tribune took up the cry that Johnson had broken with the Union party and for some days thereafter the Times was occupied with a counter-effort to read the Radicals out of the party.³⁶

The Times had consistently advocated civil equality for the negro from the day when it became apparent that slavery would be abolished. Raymond had sought to effect this end in a simple manner early in January by introducing a bill which, under the guise of an amendment to the naturalization laws, would have made all persons born in the United States citizens thereof, and would have entitled them to all of the rights and privileges of citizenship without distinction of race or color.³⁷ More directly, he had declared on the floor of the House that he thought Congress should "provide by law for giving to the freedmen of the South all the rights of citizens in courts of law and elsewhere."³⁸ Believing as he did in the principle of civil equality, he approved the purpose and principle of the Civil Rights bill though he questioned the justice and constitutionality of the provision that would have penalized a state officer for enforcing state laws discriminating against negroes. It was not fair, he said, for Congress to penalize an officer for enforcing a law for the non-enforcement of which the state would penalize him. For this reason he did not vote on the final passage of the measure,³⁹ though he

³⁶Times, Feb. 27, March 6, 1866.

³⁷Ibid., Jan. 9, 1866.

³⁸Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 492 (Jan. 29, 1866).

³⁹Ibid., 1266-67, 2512.

had voted against tabling it.⁴⁰ When Johnson's veto came, the Times was acquiescent but far from enthusiastic.⁴¹ Raymond voted to sustain the veto, though greatly perturbed at the President's unyielding course. In the hope that Weed would be able to move Johnson where other advisers had failed, Raymond begged his friend to come to Washington "for the purpose of having a talk with the President about the general policy of his administration.----- Unless he is wise, it seems to me he is ruined."⁴²

While Raymond privately brought what pressure he could to bear on Johnson, the Times anxiously urged upon Congress a conciliatory course in its relations with the President,⁴³ at the same time that it threatened a withdrawal of the patronage from opponents of the administration.⁴⁴ Conciliation was expedient politically and nationally, the paper said; politically, if the Republican party were not to be weakened; nationally, if sectionalism were to be repressed, confidence restored to trade, and the burdens under which industry suffered lightened.⁴⁵ The responsibility for breaking the deadlock between Congress and the executive the Times would have thrown upon the Joint Committee of Fifteen. After his initial vote in favor of the committee, Raymond had been hostile to it and had attacked it from time to time in the House. This attitude had been reflected in the columns of the Times, which now criticized the committee for not having presented a report. Johnson's policy was well known, the paper declared, and it was now for the committee to accept it or to present one of its own. If it desired an accommodation it could have one. But it should present its demands to the people for decision, no matter how extreme they might be.⁴⁶ When the committee finally made its

⁴⁰McPherson, Political Manual, 1866-1867, 80.

⁴¹Times, March 28, 1866.

⁴²Raymond to Weed, March, 1866, quoted in Barnes, Memoir of Weed, 452. William Cullen Bryant wrote to his daughter at this time that "poor Raymond seemed in great perplexity to know which way to turn." Nevins, Evening Post, 330.

⁴³Times, April 3 and 8, 1866.

⁴⁴Ibid., March 30, April 20, 1866.

⁴⁵Ibid., April 9, 1866.

⁴⁶Ibid., April 23 and 24, 1866. See also issues of Feb. 19 and March 1, 1866.

report, Raymond took some credit to himself that it had at last presented its full plan.⁴⁷

The plan itself did not meet with the Times' approval. As a plan of pacification and reconstruction, the paper declared, the whole thing was worse than a burlesque. It would, in fact, render reconstruction forever impossible, for the South would never consent to disfranchising her best citizens for four years, as proposed in the third of the five amendments submitted by the committee. The object of this proposal, the Times charged, was to keep the Union divided until after the election of 1870 in the hope that a Radical would be elected President. But the Times' objections were leveled only against the proposed third amendment and the bill requiring ratification of the constitutional amendments by the southern states as a condition precedent to readmission of their representatives to Congress. The other parts of the plan it found to be "just and sound."⁴⁸

Raymond took the same position in Congress. Speaking on May 9, he stated that he approved and would support four of the five proposed amendments. But the third amendment he found objectionable. Its passage by Congress, he said, would operate to prevent adoption of the other amendments. Though the majority of southerners would thereby be excluded from federal elections, they would still control the southern legislatures and they would have little desire to ratify amendments conceding certain things repugnant to them in order to gain the admission to Congress of representatives of a disliked southern minority. Urging a policy of conciliation and moderation, he warned against making the South a second Ireland.⁴⁹ Raymond's desire for compromise and his belief that the Senate would strike out the objectionable third amendment triumphed over his dislike for some portions of the program, and he voted for the Fourteenth Amendment when it passed the House on May 10. The galleries applauded his vote.⁵⁰

Though Raymond voted for the Fourteenth Amendment, he continued to oppose making its ratification a condition precedent to admission. The Times foresaw continued trouble between the

⁴⁷Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 2505.

⁴⁸Times, April 30, May 1, 1866.

⁴⁹Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 2502 f.

⁵⁰Rhodes, History of the United States, VI, 81.

President and Congress if the bill basing readmission upon ratification were passed. Johnson would veto the bill, the paper declared, for he held that the Constitution gave to every state the right to be represented on the sole condition that it sent loyal men as representatives. To obviate further conflict with the President, the Times suggested that Congress either pass the amendments and adjourn or that it substitute for the bill, which would certainly be vetoed, a concurrent resolution which would not require Johnson's signature. This editorial proposal was reiterated a few days later in an initialed letter from Raymond published in the Times.⁵¹ In the House Raymond made a lengthy speech against the bill, denying that Congress had the constitutional right to impose conditions for representation and that there was any political or military necessity for the action.⁵² Nevertheless, when the Fourteenth Amendment finally passed the House on June 13, after the Senate had thrown out the disfranchising section, the Times urged the South to accept it as "the most favorable compromise to which the North would accede."⁵³

⁵¹Times, June 4 and 12, 1866.

⁵²Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 3241-49. House Bill No. 543, against which Raymond was speaking, was referred on January 28, 1867, to the Joint Committee of Fifteen and was never reported out again.

⁵³Times, June 15, 1866.

CHAPTER V
"EVIDENT AND SIGNAL FAILURE"

The events that had transpired during the winter and spring of 1866 showed conclusively that the President could neither effect his plan of restoration without the coöperation of Congress nor expect coöperation from Congress as then constituted. If his policy were to prevail he must seek popular support in the approaching elections. The most obvious way to do this was by means of a new party and there was much talk of such an organization in the late spring. Since Johnson drew his support from the South and from Northern Democrats and Conservative Republicans, a new party, to be successful, would have to combine these diverse elements to the satisfaction of all concerned. Those Democrats who were willing to give up their party organization advocated a national constitutional party without reference to old party names.¹ The Times was representative of Conservative Republican opinion. While not averse to a political realignment, it wanted the reorganization to be effected within the Union party; it would have purged the Union ranks of Radicals and enlarged them by admitting all loyal Democrats.² The conflict between these two viewpoints, and the failure to form a new party in either way, is the story of the movement that culminated in the National Union convention which met at Philadelphia in August.

It is not certain with whom the idea for the Philadelphia convention originated.³ By the middle of June most of the Presi-

¹New York Express, cited in the Times, June 8, 1866; Beale, Critical Year, 117. The Nation, II, 553 (May 1, 1866), said that the success of a new party would be contingent upon Democratic willingness to sacrifice party name and organization.

²Times, May 23, June 4 and 8, 1866.

³Beale, Critical Year, 123-38, has the best discussion of the origin and work of the convention. Rhodes, History of the United States, VI, 99, attributes the movement to Seward and Weed, while Winston, Andrew Johnson, 353, says A. W. Randall was its leader. Smith, The Blair Family, II, 362, says that the Blairs

dent's ill-assorted group of advisers had accepted the idea that there should be a convention, but the exact scope and objective of the meeting were yet to be defined. Raymond certainly was informed of the project by June 17, and probably several days earlier.⁴ On June 18 he made a speech in Congress which can only be construed as a statement of the conditions under which he would participate in the movement. The great political necessity of the day, he declared, was to nationalize the party that saved the nation. All that was needed for the Union party to accomplish this result was for it to discard all sectional feeling, extend its organization into every state, and resist resolutely every endeavor to force upon it principles and measures that it had never espoused. In such a position, he said, the party would have every department of the government at its command; all the power and patronage of the executive would give weight and effect to its policy; and thousands of patriotic and disinterested Democrats would swell its ranks. To meet the nation's demand for a speedy restoration of peace and harmony to the Union a national party would be organized, and that party would control the government. Why, he asked, should the Union men of the country, the men who had saved the nation, allow the great work of restoration to fall into other hands?⁵

It was the hope of Senator Doolittle, who had assumed direction of the movement for a convention, and of Seward, that the National Union organization could be brought to support the convention. It was especially desirable that Raymond, as chairman of the Union National Committee, should sign the call for the

were most responsible for the movement that led to the call of the convention, though Doolittle probably was immediately responsible for the call.

⁴On June 17 Doolittle told Welles that Raymond had seen the call. Welles, Diary, II, 530 (June 18, 1866). Raymond, in his "Journal," Scribner's Monthly, XX, 276, says that he first heard of the convention from Weed about July 1. The "Journal" was not a diary, and Raymond evidently was in error concerning the exact date on which the subject was broached to him. The sequence of events which Raymond describes would indicate that Weed first talked to him between June 12 and 14.

⁵Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 3250.

meeting and, if possible, persuade other members of the committee to do likewise. Even after the call had been issued, Doolittle clung to the hope that Raymond would be able to bring the committee to support the movement--a hope that seems almost comical in view of the scant respect which it later accorded its chairman.⁶ To gain the support of Raymond in particular, as well as of other conservative Republicans, it was necessary to omit from the call any reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, since one group of the President's advisers wished specifically to condemn it while Raymond himself would have been quite willing to accept it as the party's platform.⁷ In spite of this, Raymond refused to sign the document for the professed reason that it drew no distinction between original secessionists and original Union men, making loyalty to the Union at that time the sole criterion for admission to the convention.⁸ Underlying this was a distinct uneasiness lest the Democrats capture the convention; he wished to leave the way open for retreat if the movement should not develop to his liking.⁹

Raymond's personal wariness did not extend to the Times, and from the semi-anonymity of its editorial columns he gave the movement support. Foreshadowing the call a few days before it was published, the Times proposed a National Union convention at Baltimore or Philadelphia, "not for nominations of any kind, but for consultation as to the action demanded by the changed conditions of public affairs and the necessities of the country," and to nationalize the party organization in conformity with "its principles, its spirit and its purposes." With a touch of irony, in view of Raymond's refusal to sign the call, the paper submitted the suggestion of a convention "to the National Executive Committee

⁶Welles, Diary, II, 530 (June 18, 1866); 550, (July 10, 1866).

⁷Raymond to Ransom Balcom, July 17, 1866, in the Times, Oct. 15, 1866. The letter is also in Maverick, Raymond, 173.

⁸Raymond to the Editor of the Albany Evening Journal, Dec. 12, 1867, in the Times, Dec. 26, 1867.

⁹Scribner's Monthly, XX, 278. This was the attitude of Seward and Weed also. Johnson had thought Weed would sign the call, but he did not. The decision not to have the Cabinet sign it relieved Seward of that action.

of the Union Party, or to such other members of that party as may deem it worthy of consideration."¹⁰ When the first call for the convention was published on June 26, the Times voiced its approval, declaring that only those who desired sectional parties could oppose it, since its basis was broad enough to include all Union-loving men.¹¹

The call, issued by the Executive Committee of the National Union Club, summoned delegates from every state and territory to assemble at Philadelphia on August 14. The delegates were to be chosen by supporters of the administration who subscribed to "principles" which branded exclusion of "loyal and qualified representatives" from Congress as a form of disunion, endorsed abolition while they opposed federal imposition of negro suffrage on the states, and condemned centralization of power in Congress as revolutionary.¹² Democratic support of the movement was soon forthcoming, and on July 4 forty-one Democratic congressmen issued an address "To the People of the United States," approving the call and the principles on which it was based.¹³ A few days later the National Union Club was consolidated with the National Johnson Club, an organization of Democratic antecedents, and a supplementary call was issued which was intended to divide representation in the convention equally between those who voted for Lincoln and Johnson in 1864 and those who voted against them.¹⁴

This Democratic activity was very distasteful to Raymond; so much so, indeed, that he was ready to withdraw completely from the movement. When Seward asked him to write the address for the convention, Raymond replied that he did not feel inclined to attend. There was every indication, he explained, that the meeting would be in the hands of Copperheads and of former rebels and that it would be used for purposes hostile to the Union party. If he went into another and a hostile party organization, he would feel bound to resign as chairman of the National Union Committee; he did not wish to do that or in any way to forfeit his standing as a member of the Union party. Seward protested against Raymond's

¹⁰Times, June 22, 1866.

¹¹Ibid., June 27, 1866.

¹²McPherson, Political Manual, 1866-1867, 118 f.

¹³Ibid., 119 f.

¹⁴Herald, July 11, 1866; Scribner's Monthly, XX, 276.

view of the partisan nature of the movement, stating that the convention would be simply for consultation. It would fall into Copperhead hands, he warned, unless Conservative Republicans were present, and it was for that reason that he wanted Raymond to attend.

Unable himself to convince Raymond, Seward took him to see the President, who handled him skilfully. Johnson assured him that he would like to see the Union party take exactly the national ground Raymond had indicated in his speech of June 18. Though he did not object to having the Democrats act with the Union party for the restoration of the Union, he wanted control to remain in the hands of Union men. Raymond told him that he did not understand what political action the convention was expected to take. He himself thought it too late to form a new party to nominate candidates of its own in the coming elections, even if such action were desirable, but he thought much good might be done if the convention would simply seek the election of members of Congress favorable to the admission of loyal representatives, throwing its weight in favor of Union men when they would take that ground, and of War Democrats as against extreme Radicals. Johnson concurred in this opinion, saying that what Raymond had outlined was exactly what he wished done. He wanted no new party, he said, nor did he want the Democratic party restored to power. Thus reassured, Raymond consented to participate in the convention.¹⁵

Though Raymond allowed himself to be persuaded that participation in the convention was consonant with party regularity, there were those who thought differently. Dennison, Speed, and Harlan resigned from the Cabinet rather than endorse the administration-sponsored convention.¹⁶ The Tribune loudly declared that the movement was a bolt from the Union party, engineered to pave

¹⁵Ibid., 276-77. Raymond gives the same facts in a letter to the Editor of the Albany Evening Journal, Dec. 12, 1867, published in the Times, Dec. 26, 1867.

¹⁶It is interesting to note that Raymond, Seward, and Weed were influential in preventing the dismissal of Stanton when he would not resign with his colleagues. Herald, Aug. 24, 1866. The Times was always friendly to the Secretary of War. M. Blair charged that Raymond and Weed were "well-fed favorites from the drip-pings of the State and War offices." Times, July 14, 1865.

the way to a restoration to power "of the Pro-Slavery Sham Democracy."¹⁷ Indeed, the Times said that the call for the convention affected the more violent of the Radicals as a scarlet cloak does a bull.¹⁸ Raymond was not long in feeling the force of their anger.

At a caucus of Republican congressmen on July 11, Stevens offered a resolution declaring it to be the duty of every Union man to denounce the Philadelphia convention and to render it odious to the people. He said that he wanted it distinctly understood that no one who favored the convention could have any fellowship with the Union party. Raymond was present and was reported by the Radical press to have crumpled under the attack in an ignominious fashion, admitting that he had done wrong in supporting the movement and retracting what he had written in the Times. His own story of what happened is much more in keeping with his character, for whatever his faults, he was no moral coward. According to his report, he denied any personal or political responsibility to the caucus, stating that only when his constituents or the National Union convention, by whose favor he held position in the Union party, saw fit to exclude him from the party, would he heed such exclusion; action of the caucus in regard to his party membership was a matter of complete indifference to him. He regarded the Philadelphia convention, he said, as a step toward liberalizing and nationalizing the Union party, a process that he had always considered necessary if the party were to survive. Whenever he saw reason to change his opinion as to its object and effect, he would act accordingly, for neither the Times nor its editor would support a movement intended to break up the Union party and to give power to rebels and Copperheads. Because the resolution was aimed largely at him, he refused to vote, and Hale, of New York, cast the only negative vote.¹⁹

Raymond believed that the opinion of the caucus in regard

¹⁷Ibid., June 29, July 7, 1866. The World at first opposed the convention, while the Herald approved it.

¹⁸Ibid., July 5, 1866. The Times said that J. W. Forney, of the Radical Washington Chronicle and Philadelphia Press, "raves like a man demented."

¹⁹Ibid., July 13 and 16, 1866; Scribner's Monthly, XX, 276; Barnes, Memoir of Weed, 452.

to the convention was generally shared by leaders of the Union party in all sections, and especially so in New York. But he hoped that the people approved the meeting even though party leaders opposed it.²⁰ With the object of converting this hope into an actuality, he persevered in his course of supporting the movement. He did not participate, however, in the local preparations for the convention. Thurlow Weed, in consultation with Dean Richmond and other Democratic leaders, arranged for a convention at Saratoga on August 10 to select delegates to go to Philadelphia. The meeting was well attended by both Unionists and Democrats and a bipartisan delegation was named. Though Raymond says that he declined to be a candidate,²¹ he and John A. Dix headed the delegation, which included Samuel J. Tilden and Sanford E. Church.

The thing that the Times had anticipated and warned against as the chief danger to the success of the convention²² occurred when C. L. Vallandigham, Fernando Wood, and Henry Clay Dean presented themselves as delegates. The danger was averted when the three Copperheads consented to withdraw. That Raymond was active in the maneuvers that led to this result is indicated by Dean, who said in his letter of withdrawal from the Iowa delegation that his "own Democratic regard and self-respect" prevented him from participating in a deliberative body to sustain the President where the terms of admission were dictated by Henry J. Raymond, who had voted against every distinctive measure of the administration.²³

Raymond's chief activity in connection with the convention was as draughtsman of the Declaration of Principles and of the Address to the People, which he read on August 16. That he should have been selected to write the resolutions was a triumph for the Conservative Republican faction, since Montgomery Blair had had resolutions prepared before the convention by William B. Reed, of Pennsylvania, whom Raymond considered to be in the same class with Vallandigham and Wood.²⁴ But Raymond was not to dictate the

²⁰"R" to the Times, July 15, 1866, in the Times, July 17, 1866; Raymond to R. Balcom, July 17, 1866, Maverick, Raymond, 173.

²¹Raymond to Editor of Albany Evening Journal, Dec. 12, 1867, in the Times, Dec. 26, 1867.

²²Ibid., July 6, 11, and 19, 1866.

²³Ibid., Aug. 14, 1866.

²⁴Welles, Diary, II, 574 (Aug. 8, 1866); Times, July 19, 1866.

principles which the convention would be asked to approve. From the address as he wrote it, a sub-committee of the Committee on Resolutions directed him to omit a paragraph commending the Fourteenth Amendment to the careful consideration of the southern states, as possibly demanded by the changed condition of public affairs.²⁵ The Declaration of Principles, nowever, endorsed, in effect, those sections of the amendment dealing with the rebel and federal debts and with the civil rights of freedmen.

The Address was a defence of the right of all the states to representation in Congress, based on the assertion that the war had maintained the Union and the Constitution unchanged. The policy of Congress in demanding that the southern states comply with certain conditions precedent to readmission was termed usurpation. To the justification alleged for such action, that the southern people were still disloyal in sentiment and "that neither the honor, the credit, nor the interests of the nation would be safe if they were readmitted to a share in its councils," it was replied that Congress had no right, for such reasons, to deny to any state rights expressly conferred upon it by the Constitution.²⁶ As a matter of fact, it was contended, the southern people actually were loyal: if with less enthusiasm than at the close of the war, Congress must seek the cause in its own actions. In conclusion, the people of the United States were called upon to complete the work of restoration which the President had so well begun by electing representatives who, whatever differences might characterize their political action, would unite in admitting to Congress every properly qualified loyal representative.²⁷

The enthusiasm and goodwill engendered by the convention

²⁵Raymond to Editor of the Albany Evening Journal, Dec. 12, 1867, in ibid., Dec. 26, 1867; Scribner's Monthly, XX, 279. H. W. Raymond, who edited his father's "Journal," says that both manuscript copies were in his possession and showed the change.

²⁶Stevens fiercely attacked Raymond for this assertion in a speech at Bedford, Pennsylvania, September 14, 1866. James A. Woodburn, The Life of Thaddeus Stevens, 427-28. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, II, 222-23, says that this statement, in particular, was especially distasteful to the country. See also Alexander, Political History of New York, III, 145.

²⁷The Address was published in the Times, Aug. 17, 1866.

apparently justified the complacency with which the Times regarded its work. It considered that the formidable task of organization had been completed with ease and that only "minor labors" remained to be performed. The detailed work had been transferred to the states; the process would be simple and would depend for its success upon the people. "Names and nicknames," it said, should amount to little in the approaching elections. The only question should be, was a candidate for the Union, as defined by the Constitution, or for disunion after the fashion of the Radicals?²⁸ The Times was soon to stultify itself in this matter, but not until after Raymond had suffered political humiliation because of his participation in the Philadelphia convention.

Soon after the convention four Radical members of the Union National Committee, disregarding Raymond's chairmanship, called a meeting of the committee to be held in Philadelphia on September 3 in conjunction with the Convention of Southern Loyalists. Raymond rejoined by issuing a call for the committee to meet on the same day in New York. Unable to contain himself until the irregularly called meeting could be held, Governor Marcus L. Ward, of New Jersey, addressed a letter to Raymond in which he berated him for abandoning the Union Republican party and refused to recognize him longer as chairman of the committee. Raymond replied, civilly but contemptuously, that Ward could consult his own pleasure in regard to attending the New York meeting but that he could not overrule the action of the National Union convention in appointing Raymond to the committee, or of the committee in electing him chairman. He himself did not desire to hold office in any body against the wishes of its members, but he must insist upon regularity of action. Since meetings of the committee could only be held under the call of its proper officers, action taken at meetings not so called could have no binding authority.²⁹

As coolly contemptuous of legal forms in this as in matters vitally affecting the entire nation, the Radicals proceeded with their meeting. Only eight members answered Raymond's call; after futile discussion they adjourned for want of a quorum. But the fifteen men who assembled at Philadelphia were not to be deterred

²⁸Ibid., Aug. 18, 1866.

²⁹Both letters are in the Times, Aug. 30, 1866. See also statement of N. D. Sperry, in ibid., Sept. 10, 1866.

by lack of a quorum. They adopted a resolution declaring vacant the places of Raymond, N. D. Sperry, of Connecticut, and George R. Senter, of Ohio, each of whom had attended the Philadelphia convention, and authorizing themselves to fill the vacancies upon proper recommendations.³⁰ The state Republican convention, in session at the time at Syracuse, was requested to nominate a successor to Raymond. Gladly acceding to the request, the convention shunted Horace Greeley into the place, somewhat against his will, since he would have preferred to serve on the State Central Committee.³¹ The convention also adopted "a platform on which no Johnson man" could, "by any possibility, stand upright," and nominated Reuben E. Fenton for governor.³²

The Times, professing to regard the Syracuse convention as a new party movement, urged moderate Republicans to participate in the National Union State convention which was to meet at Albany on September 11.³³ The Albany convention had been called by the Democratic State Committee which, under the guidance of Dean Richmond, had agreed to merge the Democratic name and organization in those of the National Union party. Raymond did not go to Albany, but through the Times he advocated the nomination of John A. Dix, as did Weed, who attended the convention. Dix is said also to have been the choice of Richmond, but unfortunately the Democratic leader died shortly before the convention. His followers proved loath to relinquish their party identity, though quite willing to profit by moderate Republican cooperation, and the convention developed into a contest between moderates of both parties and extreme Democrats. The latter gained the day through chicanery and nominated John T. Hoffman of the Tammany organization.³⁴ From the moderate Republican standpoint the resolutions adopted were innocuous enough in respect to national affairs, for they simply endorsed the Philadelphia platform. But they cleverly took advantage of the Philadelphia protest against federal centralization to attack state legislation passed by the Republican party for the

³⁰Ibid., Sept. 4 and 5, 1866.

³¹Herald, Sept. 5 and 6, 1866.

³²Stebbins, Political History of New York, 92, 95.

³³Times, Sept. 8 and 10, 1866.

³⁴Alexander, Political History of New York, III, 154-60; Stebbins, op. cit., 99-104.

purpose of wresting the New York city government from the hands of Tammany.³⁵

Though plainly disappointed at Dix's defeat, the Times at first gave its adherence to both the nominee and the platform. No possible exceptions could be taken to Hoffman on personal grounds, it said, though it was to have been hoped that a less distinctly Democratic candidate could have been agreed upon. Still, if Hoffman were elected it would be, not as a Democrat, but as an adherent of the Philadelphia platform. As for the Albany platform, it was one to which no valid exception could be taken.³⁶ But this acquiescence in the results of the convention was not to continue. As the inside story of Hoffman's nomination became noised abroad, the Times awoke to its full significance. It was clear, the paper said, that Hoffman was nominated, not as an exponent of the Philadelphia platform, "but as the representative of the Democratic Party and for the purpose of promoting its welfare and securing its success." The resolution relative to the relations between local political units and the state government was particularly obnoxious to Republicans, because aimed at the system of commissions established and considered essential by the Republican party "to the maintenance of anything like good government in the City of New-York." Under the circumstances, moderate Republicans, though sincerely desirous of seeing the Union restored by the admission of southern representatives to Congress, would prefer taking their chances of securing this result through action of the Republican party than in the way marked out for them by the "Albany Democratic Convention."³⁷ Several weeks later the Times announced that it was "opposed, out and out," to the election of the Albany Democratic ticket and was in favor of Fenton and his associates "on the United States ticket."³⁸

That Raymond had determined thoroughly to wash his hands of the Philadelphia movement was shown by his declining a renomination to Congress. Early in September a group of his constituents asked his permission to present his name for renomination to the Sixth Congressional District convention. Raymond's reply was a capitulation and defence of his congressional record. He had hoped

³⁵The Albany platform is in the Times, Sept. 13, 1866.

³⁶Ibid., Sept. 13, 1866. ³⁷Ibid., Sept. 17, 1866.

³⁸Ibid., Oct. 5, 1866.

and believed, he said, that the differences of opinion which prevailed in the Union party with respect to southern representation could be settled within its own ranks, without involving the risk of restoring the Democratic party to power. "Everything that I have done," he said, "has been done in that hope and to that end." But he was constrained to acknowledge that his course had led to "evident and signal failure." Since his past action failed to command the approval of a large body of his constituents, it were best for him to consult his own self-respect and the interests of the Union cause by withdrawing his name entirely from the canvass.³⁹ His political opponents charged that Raymond thus relinquished what he could not have had in any case, but this does not seem to be true. Thomas E. Stewart, the regular Republican candidate in the Sixth District, was given a majority of 1,759 over his Radical and Democratic opponents.⁴⁰

Though Raymond's repudiation of the ticket that had been nominated on the Philadelphia platform and his refusal to run again for Congress were largely caused by the ascendancy that the Democrats had gained in the Philadelphia movement when it was transferred to the several states, there was another and a pressing reason for his change of position. His partner, George Jones, had never agreed with him in his support of Johnson's reconstruction policy, but had respected the agreement that gave him absolute control of the Times' editorial policy. The Times' losses as a result of Raymond's participation in the Philadelphia convention were so great that they must have had much to do with bringing him to his partner's way of thinking. The Times probably lost a third of its subscribers because of its editor's presence at Philadelphia and Raymond himself is reported to have said that it cost the paper more than \$100,000.⁴¹

Raymond's political tumbling did not cause a direct breach between him and Johnson, to whom he was still bound by several ties. Portions of the administration program continued to meet with his approval and his political associates, Seward and Weed,

³⁹Raymond's letter, dated Sept. 15, 1866, in Maverick, Raymond, 187-89.

⁴⁰Times, Nov. 7, 1866.

⁴¹J. C. Derby, Fifty Years Among Authors, Books and Publishers, 364; Times "Jubilee Supplement," Sept. 18, 1901.

were close to the President. Seward was in the Cabinet and Weed preferred the Albany ticket, Democratic though it was, to cooperation with the New York Radical Republicans. After September, 1866, however, the political paths of Raymond and Johnson diverged increasingly, and the Times joined the ranks of the President's milder critics. Johnson was not unmindful of his obligations to Raymond and in April, 1867, nominated him as minister to Austria, but the Senate failed to confirm the nomination.⁴²

As Democrats in other states than New York sought to turn the breach between Johnson and Congress to their advantage by nominating extreme Democrats on the Philadelphia platform, the Times predicted that such action would defeat the cause it professed to serve. The public mind dreaded renewed ascendancy of the Democratic party, it declared, more than it did the continued exclusion of the southern states. All other issues were overlooked in the popular determination to prevent that ascendancy. In voting for Radical candidates the people would not be voting for the extreme program of that faction, but against the party that betrayed the nation.⁴³ In the results of the October elections the Times found proof of its assertions.⁴⁴ Even more important than the rebuke to the Democracy conveyed by the elections was the popular endorsement of Congress, rather than the President, as the agent of reconstruction. The latter had stated his own case, the Times said, and the people had refused to accept it. The part of statesmanship was to concede graciously and promptly to the popular verdict and to assist Congress in the execution of

⁴²Raymond's name was sent to the Senate without his having been advised of the nomination. He promptly declined the appointment, but Johnson did not withdraw his name. He was the fourth person whom Johnson nominated in an effort to find an acceptable successor to Motley.

⁴³Times, Sept. 25, 1866. See also issue of Sept. 20, 1866. E. D. Morgan to John Bigelow, Sept. 16, 1866, makes the same point: "There is a fear that the President really intends to get the Government into the hands, for control, of those lately in rebellion, and their sympathetic associates. I neither assert this nor believe it, but no matter; the people believe it, and 'that's what's the matter' at the polls." Bigelow, Retrospections, III, 556.

⁴⁴Times, Oct. 12, 1866.

its policy.⁴⁵

The Times was positive, however, in its assertion that Republican success at the polls did not constitute a popular endorsement of Radicalism. It regretted that the issues of the campaign had not been shaped in such a way as to place the Radicals on trial, but insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment had been the specific issue in the October, as it would be in the November, elections. The proposed amendment, it declared, far from embodying Radicals demand, was unsatisfactory to the extremists. Only prompt action on the part of the South could prevent the Radicals from making and enforcing even harsher conditions for readmission than those contained in the amendment. The dictates of enlightened self-interest should cause the South to ratify it. If that were done, public sentiment would be so strong in favor of admitting southern representatives to Congress that nothing could resist it.⁴⁶ The Times maintained this tone even after the President, speaking through O. H. Browning, had sharply attacked the amendment as tending toward a dangerous centralization of government.⁴⁷ It was to have been hoped, the Times said, that if Johnson would not reconsider his decision and recommend the amendment to the southern people as a result of the fall elections, he would at least allow the issue to be fought out without his interference. His determination to disregard the elections and to continue his efforts to prevent ratification of the amendment was "a grievous error" that could only serve to aggravate existing difficulties and to intensify the bitterness which characterized their discussion.⁴⁸

The results of the November elections caused the Times to assume an even more positive tone in pressing support of the Fourteenth Amendment upon Johnson. The President had the power to bring about the restoration of the Union, the Times said, by advising the South to ratify the amendment. Having the power to

⁴⁵Ibid., Oct. 11, 1866.

⁴⁶Ibid., Oct. 10, 16, and 20, 1866.

⁴⁷Browning to W. H. Benneson and H. V. Sullivan, Oct. 13, 1866, in ibid., Oct. 24, 1866. This letter was published with the approval of Johnson, who stated that it fully presented his position.

⁴⁸Ibid., Oct. 25, 1866.

end the conflict in that way, he could not "wisely or honorably evade the responsibility" that it involved.⁴⁹ In any case, Johnson should consider his active work in connection with restoration ended and should leave all further formulation of policy to Congress, confining himself to exerting his influence to induce the acceptance by the South of whatever terms Congress might finally propose.⁵⁰ The hope that Johnson would concede anything of principle or policy to Congress was blasted by his second annual message to that body. The Times did not attempt to conceal its disappointment and its disapproval of his uncompromising course. In no respect, it said, did the President attempt to meet, or even indirectly to recognize, the recent expression of public opinion in the states that elevated him to office. The result of his intransigence could only be to afford the Radicals a pretext for a renewed attack upon the executive authority.⁵¹

As it became evident that the southern states would not ratify the amendment, the Times turned upon them as it had upon the President. Up until this time Raymond had repeatedly declared, in Congress and elsewhere, that any increase of bitterness in the southern attitude toward the North was due to the severity of the Radical policy and was justified.⁵² But now the Times declared that the real obstacle to restoration was the aversion of southern politicians to everything calculated to insure the peace and integrity of the nation. It warned the South that if it did not accept the amendment, Congress would ruthlessly apply the territorial policy and legislate the acting governments of the southern states out of existence. Those governments were but the products of the President's provisional policy, it said, and had no regular constitutional validity. Though Congress could not reduce a state to a territorial condition, it could regulate the conditions under which its governmental machinery should be reconstituted. Such

⁴⁹Ibid., Nov. 17, 1866. See also issues of Nov. 8 and 9, 1866.

⁵⁰Ibid., Nov. 19, 1866. ⁵¹Ibid., Dec. 4, 1866.

⁵²See Raymond's speech at Cooper's Institute, Feb. 22, 1866, in ibid., Feb. 23, 1866; his speech in Congress, June 18, 1866, in Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 3241-49; and the Philadelphia convention Address to the People in the Times, Aug. 17, 1866.

action would not be a violation of constitutional principles; it would be a simple recognition of circumstances as the rebels themselves had made them. This solution of the problem would be preferable to continued severance of the Union or to allowing the rebel leaders to dictate the terms of restoration. Indeed, the North obviously did not intend that the southern states should have any voice in determining those terms.⁵³

Thus Raymond approached more nearly the Radical position than he ever had before, but his swing to the left did nothing to restore him to his former influence in the Republican party. The party leaders were determined to make him smart for his apostasy of the previous summer. When he attended the caucus at the opening of Congress, J. M. Ashley, of Ohio, suggested that he could not properly sit in a Republican caucus after having participated in the Philadelphia convention. A resolution which would have excluded him was tabled by only two votes, and it was finally decided that Raymond himself should determine the propriety of his sitting in the caucus.⁵⁴ His action in the matter is not known, though he probably continued to participate in the deliberations of the party. Whether he did or not was apparently of little moment to anyone save himself. John Hay seems to have expressed the general opinion when, after a visit to Congress, he recorded in his diary: "Raymond talked a little--clever and fluent as ever, and impressing nobody."⁵⁵

⁵³Ibid., Dec. 6, 10, 14, 15, 17, and 21, 1866.

⁵⁴Ibid., Dec. 6, 1866.

⁵⁵Extract from Hay's diary, Feb. 9, 1867. William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay, I, 265.

CHAPTER VI
RECONSTRUCTION

The policy of the Times became less aggressive in regard to the political and constitutional aspects of reconstruction after the elections of 1866. The logic of events forced the paper to recede from positions on which its convictions had been pronounced. It had consistently maintained that the Constitution survived the war unchanged and that restoration was a proper function of the executive. The elections demonstrated that Congress, rather than the President, was to be the agent of reconstruction, and the paper accepted the popular verdict with good grace. The reconstruction program which Congress enacted into law in the short session caused the Times to admit the futility of urging constitutional restrictions upon congressional action. Where the Times had sought to form public opinion, it was now content to follow.

Raymond had insisted upon one thing in the House--that Congress take final and effective action in the matter of reconstruction. Congress had not stood on the same basis from one year to the next, he said. If the majority had a policy, they ought to present it and take the responsibility of acting upon it. He, for one, was ready to vote for it if it commended itself to his judgment, and as ready to be outvoted and submit if it did not.¹

The original military reconstruction bill failed to meet with Raymond's approval and he voted against it when it first passed the House. He believed that a show of military force was necessary in the South,² but he thought it preferable to set up a civil government and to support it with as great a military force as circumstances might dictate.³ When it became apparent that some kind of military reconstruction act would be passed, the Times acquiesced in the idea of martial law for the South and contented itself with urging modifications of the original bill. The points

¹Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 720 (Jan. 24, 1867).

²Times, Feb. 9, 1867.

³Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 1103 (Feb. 8, 1867).

to which it particularly objected were the preamble, which embodied Stevens' conquered province theory, the provision for vesting in General Grant a power that was constitutionally the President's as commander-in-chief, and the section which would have disfranchised practically all of the whites while forcing universal negro suffrage.⁴ The Senate modified the provisions to which the Times objected,⁵ and Raymond voted for the amended bill. Even before final passage of the bill the Times expressed the hope that Johnson would not veto it, declaring that the only result of such action would be to encourage the South in its opposition to the measure.⁶ The veto itself brought from the Times the declaration that, while it did not doubt the integrity of the President's motives, it was plain that Congress controlled the road to the reconstruction of the Union, and that no good could result from a denial of its right or from resistance to its policy.⁷ Raymond voted to override the veto.

The Times acquiesced in military reconstruction because it held it "preferable to prolonged uncertainty or delay."⁸ But it was under no illusions as to the nature of the Reconstruction Act, the terms of which it deemed "unjust and inexpedient--at war with the Constitution and hostile to the dictates of a wise and considerate statesmanship."⁹ Indeed, it held that the act violated the Constitution in most of its provisions. To justify its support of an unconstitutional measure, the Times felt it necessary to advance a more cogent argument than that of expediency. Taking, at last, a realistic view of the situation, it declared that it was useless to ignore "the plain and palpable fact" that the war had revolutionized the government.¹⁰ The country was not living under the Constitution of 1789, it said, but under an unwritten Constitution which represented the national will as embodied in the action of Congress. The war had wrought a revolution in public sentiment, which in its turn wrought a corresponding revolution in

⁴Times, Feb. 9, 16, and 18, 1867.

⁵See William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction, 126; Rhodes, History of the United States, VI, 129-32.

⁶Times, Feb. 22, 1867. ⁷Ibid., March 4, 1867.

⁸Ibid., March 5, 1867. ⁹Ibid., March 11, 1867.

¹⁰Cf. Dunning, op. cit., 49, 56-60.

the practical administration of the government. Congress represented that revolution in its post-war aspects and, acting under its inspiration, exercised the power which it conferred. This being the actual state of public affairs, it was wiser to adjust public action to it than to waste strength and time in contending against it.¹¹

The Times had expected financial problems to receive a large share of attention during the short session of Congress and had hoped that a fixed and recognized financial policy would be formulated. Two things, in its opinion, were especially important. It should be finally settled that inflation had reached its maximum and that there would be a gradual return to specie payment.¹² A policy of gradual contraction was one that the Times had advocated since the close of the war, and Secretary McCulloch's plan to contract the currency by a funding program had met with its full approval. The opposition to retiring the greenbacks, the paper declared, came only from paper money theorists and speculators. The inconveniences which deflation would entail upon limited classes and special interests would be as nothing compared with the great national interest of industry and trade, which would be benefitted by the overthrow of speculative values and the assimilation of prices to the only standard compatible with the permanent maintenance of the public credit.¹³ To the argument of inflationists that an increase in the currency was needed to meet the requirements of the South, the Times replied that it would be wiser to meet those needs by a revision and reduction of the circulation at the North. The volume of currency already was far in advance of the legitimate requirements of business, with a resultant high cost of living and a fluctuation in prices that prevented restoration of trade to a wholesome condition.¹⁴ Sudden deflation would be too disastrous to be attempted,¹⁵ but to keep afloat the amount of money then in circulation, or to increase it, would be to prolong an exhaustive drain upon the industry and business of the country which their depressed condition rendered them unable much

¹¹Times, March 19, 1867. ¹²Ibid., Dec. 20, 1866.

¹³Ibid., March 24, 1866. ¹⁴Ibid., Dec. 13, 1866.

¹⁵The Tribune's policy, by contrast, was summarized in the phrase, "The way to resume is to resume." Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States (10th ed.), 335.

longer to endure.¹⁶

The strength developed in Congress by paper money advocates, who were able to pass through the House a bill authorizing redemption of compound interest notes by a new issue of non-interest legal tender notes not to exceed \$100,000,000,¹⁷ caused the Times much concern. The contest possessed an alarming significance, the paper said, as an indication of the determination of a powerful party in Congress to resist and, if possible, to reverse the policy of currency contraction. The doctrine propounded by this group was not that the system of legal tender paper was a necessary evil, arising from the war and to be abated as soon as possible, but that it was a positive good. The Times recognized that the question was sectional rather than partisan, pointing out that a majority of the representatives of the older states favored contraction, while a majority of the members from the younger states not only opposed contraction but actually favored inflation. The growing political power of the West rendered this manifestation of opinion particularly noticeable, the Times declared, but powerful though the West might be, it would be impotent against economic law. The country could not afford the perilous experimentalizing which the House approved.¹⁸

Closely connected with the currency and debt questions, in the opinion of the Times, was the tariff system. Though far from being an advocate of free trade, the Times was committed to a downward revision of the tariff in the interests of commerce and the consumer as a part of the general post-war economic readjustment. The paper had given full publicity to David A. Wells' report on the revenue system, which was published in January, 1866. The report constituted "a great public service," it said, though "a little greater frankness" in regard to certain duties weighing heavily on agricultural and commercial communities would have been welcome.¹⁹ In connection with the discussion of the Morrill tariff bill of 1866, which would have increased duties even above the war level, the Times deprecated efforts of the Tribune and of protectionists in Congress to commit the Union party to a policy of extreme protection. The party included within its wings, it said, persons of all shades of opinion on the tariff question, and a

¹⁶Times, Dec. 24, 1866.

¹⁷Dewey, *op. cit.*, 343.

¹⁸Times, Feb. 25, 1867.

¹⁹Ibid., Jan. 30, Feb. 4, 1866.

convention of the party had never ventured to enunciate a principle of either high or low protection.²⁰ Recognizing the sectionalism implicit in the tariff controversy, the Times declared that the welfare of the West and South, and of consumers everywhere, was being threatened for the aggrandizement of the manufacturers of less than a half dozen eastern states. The position of reasonable men who sought the financial welfare of all sections was to arrange a tariff solely with reference to the production of revenue and to lay the greater part of the burden on a few articles of luxury. The paper was careful to point out the conflict of interest between manufacturer and consumer, declaring that the interests of the latter were the more important. As for protection, the very nature of the protective argument made it a temporary thing. The Times did not object to protection as long as revenue was not thereby diminished, but it denounced the selfish clamor of "monopolists."²¹

Raymond took the same position in Congress. Opposing an increase in the duty on rails, he said that his great objection to the cry for protection was not that it was wrong in principle but that there was no end to it. The country was told in the beginning that if an infant manufacture were protected it would stand alone. After thirty or forty years of protection, however, every session of Congress witnessed new demands for increased protection. There were other interests than the rolling industry entitled to protection. Railroads, for instance, would suffer heavily by the proposed tariff on rails, and he cited the cost of replacement to the New York Central and Erie Railroads if the new rates should be adopted. He desired to see the time come when the iron interest would be able to protect itself.²² Though his dislike for the bill was apparent, Raymond absented himself from the House when the vote was taken. The bill passed the House but was not brought to a vote in the Senate during the first session. It came up for consideration the next year, and the Senate substituted for it a bill drafted by David A. Wells which, though it did not

²⁰Ibid., July 7, 1866. Raymond regarded the Union party as an organization distinct from the Republican party of 1856. Cf. Dunning, "The Second Birth of the Republican Party," American Historical Review, XVI.

²¹Times, June 30, July 1 and 3, 1866.

²²Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 3516 (June 30, 1866).

embody free trade principles, was a reform measure from the protectionist viewpoint.²³ The extraordinary majority necessary to bring the Senate substitute to a vote in the House could not be mustered, but it was apparent from Raymond's votes on parliamentary motions in connection with the bill that he preferred the original Morrill bill.²⁴ The Times, however, found certain of the rates in the liberal Senate bill indefensible on revenue grounds, and feared that the "extortionate demands of the protectionists for more profit" would be heeded and obeyed by Congress while "the pleadings of the patient people for relief" would be "obstinately ignored."²⁵

The economic uncertainties implicit in an unrestored Union had not constituted the least important factor in bringing the Times to support congressional reconstruction. There could be no assurance of solid, lasting peace, it said, while ten states stood out of the Union. The merchant and the manufacturer were left to grope in darkness so long as the states which were richest in natural advantages continued practically closed to northern enterprise.²⁶ In conformity with its frequent assertion that it would not oppose "anything" that promised "a restored Union," the Times urged Congress to perfect its reconstruction plan as soon as possible, and it accepted without criticism the supplementary reconstruction acts.²⁷

While thus offering substantial support to the program of the Republican majority in Congress, the Times refrained from any sharp criticism of the President until his quarrel with Stanton. The Times had always fought Stanton's battles, and Raymond had voted for the Tenure-of-Office Act. When the Secretary of War was suspended, the Times accused Johnson of deliberately reopening the conflict with Congress. His action, it said, proved him as unmindful of the obligations resting upon him as he was indifferent to the requirements of the South and the real interests of the country. In its opinion, the President was actuated by a two-fold motive--to frustrate the congressional plan of reconstruction and to strengthen the Democratic "pro-rebel and repudiating influence"

²³See Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (5th ed., rev.), 175-78.

²⁴House Journal, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 490, 529.

²⁵Times, Jan. 25 and 29, 1867.

²⁶Ibid., Jan. 23, 1867. ²⁷Ibid., July 8, 1867.

then active in Ohio and Pennsylvania. To effect the first object, he exhibited a "pettifogging keenness and dexterity" in advancing the letter of the Constitution as a pretext for interposing his hostile authority to circumvent the clearly expressed will of Congress. To effect the second, he would appoint Democrats to vacancies created by removing Republicans, of whom Stanton was an eminent example. Though slightly apologetic that Stanton should wish to remain in the Cabinet after the President had requested his resignation, the Times advanced with evident approval the argument of the Secretary's friends that his responsibility was "to the majority of Congress, whose confidence he enjoys and whose will he would enforce," and that he could not "honorably abandon the trust which Congress intended in a certain degree to render independent of Mr. Johnson."²⁸ Stanton was being removed, the paper declared, "solely and simply as a punishment of his sturdy Unionism and his unyielding antagonism to the pro-rebel policy of the President." Any Cabinet officer who made himself a party to the purpose manifested in his suspension identified himself with the enemies of the Republican party and of the Union.²⁹

What seemed to be a tendency on the part of the Times toward the Radical position was sharply checked by Democratic successes in the fall elections in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. The Times interpreted the elections not as a reaction in favor of the Democrats but as a rebuke to the Radicals. The people were tired, it said, of the evident intention of the Radicals to perpetuate their own power by excluding the South from participation in the presidential elections. They did not object to negro suffrage in the South,³⁰ but it should not be forced on the people at the point of the bayonet, nor should the mass of southern whites be disfranchised.³¹ Raymond's return from Europe, where he had spent the summer, may also have contributed toward the Times' change of tone; indeed, the absence of his restraining hand may have been responsible in the first place for the harsher attitude of the paper.

²⁸Ibid., Aug. 7, 8, 23, and 30, 1867.

²⁹Ibid., Aug. 13, 1867.

³⁰Ohio had just rejected a proposal of negro suffrage.

³¹Ibid., Oct. 14, 1867. See also issues of Oct. 2 and Nov. 7, 1867.

As the fall wore on the Times assumed a much less critical attitude toward the President. When Johnson sent his reasons for suspending the Secretary of War to Congress in December, the Times found the message an able document, well calculated to relieve him of unjust accusations. It took for granted that Stanton would not, in any case, resume his seat in the Cabinet.³² After Stanton's restoration by the Senate the paper urged that he resign in order to forestall charges of personal and partisan malevolence.³³ Though increasingly critical of Stanton, the Times supported at every step the part that Grant played in the controversy. The previous June it had announced that Grant was its candidate for the Republican nomination in 1868,³⁴ and it was now intent on advancing his candidacy. It refused to see in his surrender of the War Department to Stanton an alignment with the Radicals, as did the Democratic press, and even after Johnson had questioned his veracity it insisted that he had acted throughout with a stern and lofty sense of duty.³⁵

The controversy with Stanton was bringing the movement to impeach the President, which had been under way for some time, rapidly to a head. The Times had regarded Ashley's impeachment motion of the previous session of Congress as "a gratuitous disturbance of the peace of the country,"³⁶ and Raymond had voted against it. It still deprecated impeachment, holding that there was no warrant for it in facts and that neither justice nor the public interest demanded it, but it laid the blame for the revival of the scheme squarely at the President's door. The whole project had been dead, it said, beyond the power of anyone or of any party to revive it until Johnson himself had given it life. What the Radicals could not do for themselves, he had done for them by such ill-advised acts as the removal of Sheridan and the suspension of Stanton.³⁷ But denying that these or any other acts of the President warranted impeachment, the Times charged that the movement was partisan in conception and in execution; it did not believe

³²Ibid., Dec. 17, 1867. ³³Ibid., Jan. 15, 1868.

³⁴Ibid., June 11, 1867. See also issues of Oct. 17, 1867; Jan. 22, 1868. The Herald proposed Grant as early as February, 1866.

³⁵Ibid., Jan. 21, Feb. 6, 1868.

³⁶Ibid., Jan. 8, 1867. ³⁷Ibid., Oct. 1 and 7, 1867.

that the House would sustain the recommendation of a majority of its committee of investigation that the President be impeached.³⁸ Though regarding Johnson "as beyond the reach of political redemption," since his errors of judgment, temper, and conduct had made it impossible for any political party ever to espouse his cause, the Times thought that the relentless investigation into his character and conduct by his "malignant enemies" could only rebound to his personal and official advantage. All that the country then asked of Congress, the paper said, was that it would "bury this whole offensive and pestilent proceeding, as speedily as possible, out of the public sight."³⁹

After impeachment became a certainty, the Times exhibited great concern for its probable effect on the fortunes of the Republican party, though it was not unmindful of its constitutional significance. If Johnson were removed, it said, it was reasonably certain that no President would thereafter hold his place when a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate belonged to the opposite party. For that reason, if for no other, it was necessary that he have a fair, impartial, and judicial trial.⁴⁰ The Times found Benjamin F. Butler's management of the trial "a disgraceful spectacle" and his methods comparable to those of "the 'shysters' of our low criminal courts";⁴¹ but it declared that the bearing of the Senate had been "decorous, impartial, just," and that the popular sense of justice was satisfied.⁴² Though surprised at the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution,⁴³ the Times expected a verdict of guilty. Other than strictly judicial considerations had entered into the trial, it said, and other than strictly judicial rules would probably govern the result. The immediate result of the trial was not of great interest, for it was of very little consequence to the country, or to any human being in it, whether Johnson stayed in office ten months longer or not, but the paper feared for its effect on the Republican party. From the party viewpoint, it said, the impeachment was a mistake. The

³⁸ Ibid., Nov. 26, 1867.

³⁹ Ibid., Dec. 2, 1867.

⁴⁰ Ibid., March 13, 1868.

⁴¹ Ibid., April 13, 1868.

⁴² Ibid., April 30, 1868.

⁴³ Ibid., April 20, 1868. The Times thought that Johnson's imprudence and the "foolish and unjustifiable course" he had pursued would have offered much stronger grounds for removal.

removal of Johnson would throw the party into the hands of the Radicals. It would make the party entirely responsible for the national administration (and, by implication, deprive it of a scape-goat), while the new President's term would not be long enough to do the party much good before the election. In short, the Republicans would incur all of the responsibility and reap none of the advantages of removal.⁴⁴ When it became evident that Johnson would be acquitted by the votes of several Republican senators, the Times declared that the party might "yet have reason to thank these men for saving it from self-destruction."⁴⁵

Rivaling the impeachment proceedings in political importance, if not in dramatic intensity, during the winter of 1867-1868, was the pressure of the West, supported by easterners such as Ben Butler and Thad Stevens, for inflation. The "Ohio idea," proposing to wipe out the national debt and to inflate the currency at one and the same time by the payment of both interest and principal in greenbacks, had met with the unqualified condemnation of the Times when advanced by George H. Pendleton in the summer of 1867. While opposing the proposal on economic and moral grounds, the paper chose also to see in it a machination of the "Chicago Peace Party" of 1864, whose nominee for the vice-presidency Pendleton had been, indirectly to impugn the justice of the war for the maintenance of the Union.⁴⁶ The people did not want to repudiate the debt, the Times insisted, but they did want relief from the crushing burden of taxation. The proper antidote for the inflation movement was a reform by Congress of the revenue system in the interest of the laboring and commercial man.⁴⁷ The tariff was an

⁴⁴Ibid., April 30, May 8 and 15, 1868.

⁴⁵Ibid., May 13, 1868. The Times later bestowed unstinted praise on the seven Republican senators who voted for acquittal, saying that they "asserted in the grandest manner ever known in America, their personal independence, the independence of the Senate, the rights of conscience and private judgment and their own honor." Ibid., May 17, 1868.

⁴⁶Ibid., Aug. 20, 1867.

⁴⁷Ibid., Oct. 11, Nov. 11, 1867. See also issue of March 18, 1867. Congress, by an Act of March 31, 1868, effected a great reduction in the internal taxes, an action which the Times heartily approved. Taussig, Tariff History, 172.

obvious field for reform in this connection, but the Times feared that any agitation of that question, which it saw as the "greatest peril" in the path of the Republican party, would split the Republican organization in the Northwest wide open. The proper course was to relegate settlement of the tariff question to the indefinite future, for "it were criminal to anticipate causes of party difference" or to divert public attention from the great work of restoring the Union.⁴⁸

The undoubted strength of the inflationists caused the Times in the fall of 1867 to recede from its previous position in favor of gradual contraction. It deemed further contraction impossible at that time, not because the volume of currency was not still in excess of the wants of commerce, but because public opinion was almost universally opposed to persistence in the policy of retiring greenbacks. The alternative seemed to be between stoppage of contraction, leaving what had been effected untouched, and further issues of paper money. For this reason the paper urged and welcomed the abandonment by Congress in February, 1868, of McCulloch's policy of gradual contraction. It hoped, however, that Congress would be content with that action and that it would not restore to circulation the currency that had been retired.⁴⁹ A similar yielding to public opinion was to be seen in the Times' position on the national debt. Where, in 1865, it had termed the proposal of the World to tax United States bonds, "bad faith and robbery joined,"⁵⁰ it now admitted that discontent over the burden of the debt, especially in the West, would force the bondholders to submit either to taxation or to refunding at a lower rate of interest, and it urged the latter alternative.⁵¹ But it gave no ground in the matter of retiring the debt with greenbacks, regarding all such proposals as electioneering maneuvers too preposterous for serious consideration.⁵²

The Times expected government finance to be an important issue in the campaign of 1868, and it begged the Republican party to remember that its true interest lay "in the construction of a

⁴⁸ Times, Sept. 21, Nov. 10, 1867.

⁴⁹ Ibid., Nov. 19 and 22, Dec. 9, 1867; Feb. 3, 1868.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Aug. 15, 1865.

⁵¹ Ibid., Jan. 4, Feb. 17, March 7, 1868.

⁵² Ibid., Feb. 5, March 12, 1868.

policy that satisfied the cool judgment of the business community." The bond question might be left to adjust itself under the anticipation of a resumption of specie payment, but the party must maintain decided ground against inflation "if it would preserve its pretensions as a party which solvent men may consistently support."⁵³ Regarding the nomination of Grant as a certainty, the Times considered the platform to be the only issue before the Republican convention. It hoped that the party would free itself from Radical domination and would repudiate Radical dogmas such as universal negro suffrage by congressional enactment, abolition of the presidency with administration of the government by a committee subject to the will of Congress (as advocated by the German element of the party), and denial of the Supreme Court's right to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional.⁵⁴ It warned in particular against incorporating in the platform an endorsement of impeachment,⁵⁵ and felt that the convention seriously erred in disregarding its advice. Most of the platform met with its approval, and the financial plank, with its emphatic denunciation of repudiation, gained its especial approbation. It also saw a victory for conservatives in the plank that would have left suffrage in the loyal states to state action. In view of the Radical influence evidently uppermost at Chicago, it said, the platform was as good as could be expected.⁵⁶

The Times was far from confident of Republican success until after the Democratic convention. If the Democrats should wake up to the fact that the country had gone through a civil war, and act accordingly, it said, their chances of success would be good. Chase would be the strongest man they could name, but the paper thought his nomination impossible under the two-thirds rule. Such a nomination, if it could be effected, "would signalize the acceptance of the results of the war" by the Democracy and would give it a new lease of active political life.⁵⁷ In Seymour and Blair, however, the Times declared that the Democrats had nominated a weak ticket. Seymour was distasteful to the electorate because of his war record and Blair because of his pre-convention letter

⁵³Ibid., May 6 and 10, 1868.

⁵⁴Ibid., April 18, 1868. ⁵⁵Ibid., May 18, 1868.

⁵⁶Ibid., May 22 and 25, 1868.

⁵⁷Ibid., May 1, June 8, 1868.

to James O. Broadhead promising the overthrow of reconstruction in the event of a Democratic victory.⁵⁸ The Times did not scruple to declare that the Broadhead letter was constructively, if not literally, a part of the Democratic platform.⁵⁹ Coupling the threat against congressional reconstruction with the Democratic plank declaring for the payment of the five-twenty bonds in greenbacks, it used them to play upon the fears of business men. A rise in the price of gold during the summer was attributed to the possibility of Democratic success. "The interests of commerce and finance," the Times declared repeatedly, "are deeply involved in the issues of the election, upon the result of which depends the renewal or destruction of confidence in the credit and peace of the country."⁶⁰

In Grant's election the Times saw the country's repudiation of repudiation. "Repudiation, like rebellion, is dead," it declared. "There is no need for fighting that enemy any longer."⁶¹ But before Grant could be inducted into office the issue was to crop up again from an unexpected source. On December 9, Johnson sent to Congress his proposal to retire the debt by applying the 6 per cent interest then paid to the reduction of the principal. He justified the plan on the ground that the holders of securities had already received upon their bonds a larger amount than their original investment, measured by a gold standard.⁶² It was more than the Times could stand. Abandoning all pretense of personal friendliness toward and respect for the President, the paper said that it had tried hard to hold its original faith in his personal honesty, and to attribute his disastrous actions "to errors of judgment and infirmities of temper." But it could maintain its faith no longer, for it was impossible to reconcile his language in regard to the national debt with "integrity of purpose, or any sincere regard for the honor and welfare of the nation." The

⁵⁸ Ibid., July 10, 1868. For the Broadhead letter, see Smith, The Blair Family, II, 406 f.

⁵⁹ Times, Sept. 21, 1868.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Aug. 5, 1868. See also issues of July 11, Sept. 28, 1868.

⁶¹ Ibid., Nov. 5 and 12, 1868.

⁶² Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 672-91.

promulgation of Johnson's proposal could only strengthen the feeling of relief that his impending retirement from the presidency was calculated to awaken. "An Executive who counsels tampering with the public creditor is more than an embarrassment; he is a calamity, deliverance from which must make us thankful."⁶³

⁶³Times, Dec. 10 and 11, 1868.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Raymond died within a few months of Grant's inauguration.¹ His death was sincerely mourned by the New York press, which saw in his demise the passing of a great journalist. Friends and erstwhile foes alike lauded him, but their words of praise were not unqualified. While conceding to him an absolute integrity of motive, all commentators saw in his political activity an error which marred his career as a journalist. But political activity in itself was not condemned so much as the direction that Raymond's had taken. There was nothing but praise for his course during the Civil War. Even his friends, however, felt it necessary to apologize for his support of Johnson in 1865 and 1866; that was considered to have been his great mistake. His return to the party fold after the fall elections of the latter year was regarded as a confession of error and a sign of repentance. Had Raymond lived beyond the period in which the most controverted actions of his life took place, the editorial comments on his death might well have taken a different tone. Given a perspective denied to his contemporaries, his apologists might have felt it necessary to defend his desertion of Johnson rather than his initial support of the President.

Raymond's reconstruction program had its roots in the political necessities of the war, and was predicated on Lincoln's premise, which he made his own, that the war was fought to preserve the Union. Every consideration was to be subsidiary, in the first place, to winning the war, and, in the second, to restoring the Union after the war was won. This meant that the slavery question was to be kept as much in abeyance as possible, and that the administration was to be supported in its assumption of extraordinary powers in prosecuting the war. It meant that all talk of a negotiated peace, of "peace without victory," must be promptly quelled. And by 1864 it meant that Lincoln's reconstruction plan should be supported in the interests of his renomination and a restored

¹Raymond died on June 18, 1869.

Union.

It was inevitable that Raymond should have thrown the Times to Johnson's support after the death of Lincoln. During the war he had made his paper the organ of the Lincoln administration, and Johnson's succession could be considered only as a continuation of that administration. He had been personally instrumental in the nomination of Johnson for the vice-presidency, and he could hardly have deserted his own candidate. The New York political situation also tended to align him with the new President. Seward was in the Cabinet and Weed, who had taken pains to cultivate Johnson, sang his praises on all sides while, on the other hand, the Greeley wing of the party was lining up with the Radicals. Apart from factional considerations, the Lincoln-Johnson program appealed to Raymond's native moderation at the same time that it promised a speedy return of normal business conditions, so important to the prosperity of New York.

The presidential plan of restoration which Raymond publicized in the Times was a statesmanlike program. Not the least important element of statesmanship is political sagacity, and though the program's chances of success probably would have been slim enough in the welter of post-war passions, its fate was to turn not upon its merits but upon the political maladroitness of its proponents. An aggressive policy might have been successful. Raymond, hoping that Congress would not dare to undo the President's work, hesitated to stir up the factional struggle already incipient in the Union ranks, and Johnson had decided to let the onus of starting the fight fall on the Radicals. When Congress convened Raymond committed himself to a method of procedure that was certain to operate to the disadvantage of the presidential plan by voting for the creation of the Joint Committee of Fifteen. Whatever the reason for his vote, he was guilty of an error of judgment that seriously impaired his future influence.

For a brief period it seemed that Raymond might achieve a position of leadership in the House. His speech in reply to Stevens was forceful and impressive, but an exponent of the executive prerogative could hardly have hoped to make much headway in a House long restive under executive domination and lately freed from it by the successful termination of the war. It might be questioned whether Raymond himself would have been ready to champion the executive had he been in the House long enough to have

become imbued with its esprit de corps. Apart from the jealousy between legislature and executive, however, Raymond's constitutional arguments in support of an unchanged Union were unconvincing in view of the facts of the war and the de facto government that had existed for four years at the South. The House rejected his proffered leadership.

During the winter of 1866 the Times was steadfast in its support of Johnson and sharply criticized Congress for its failure to cooperate with him to effect the speedy restoration of the southern states. Raymond failed to realize the adamant nature of the President's determination, which was so foreign to his own temperament. He believed that the only difference between the President and Congress was one of degree in the guaranties to be demanded of the South, and his own willingness to compromise led him to endorse measures which the President later vetoed. The necessity he was under of reversing his position on both the Freedmen's Bureau and the Civil Rights bills indicates that he was not in the close confidence of the President. The repassage of the latter over the veto showed conclusively that Johnson could not carry his program unamended, and Raymond voted for the Fourteenth Amendment as the best compromise to which the North would agree.

Under all of Raymond's inconsistencies there was a basic consistency of purpose. He hoped to demonstrate by a willingness to compromise that there was no essential reason for discord in the Union party. His purpose was commendable, but Johnson's use of the veto made his method worse than futile. It was impossible to hold to the middle of the road with Andrew Johnson on the one side and Thaddeus Stevens on the other. By summer, old Gideon Welles regarded him as a Radical, the Radicals would have none of him, and the Democrats felt free to taunt him with not knowing the difference between restoration and reconstruction. His moral courage was superb, for he took an inordinate amount of political punishment before he was through, but it is possible that he did actual harm to the Conservative cause.

Still actuated by the hope of consolidating moderate Union sentiment in support of the presidential plan, Raymond reluctantly consented to participate in the Philadelphia convention. If, as Professor Beale says,² the great mistake of the convention was in

²Critical Year, 137-38.

not organizing a new party, a large share of the blame must fall upon Raymond. He resolutely refused to have anything to do with a new party movement, preferring to seek a realignment within the Union party. Raymond's objection to a new party was not due to excessive loyalty to a particular name and organization, for he had been Whig, Republican, and Unionist in turn, but he could see no hope for a party outside of the Union organization that would not be dominated by Democrats. If there was one thing of which he was more firmly convinced than any other, it was that the Democrats, as a party, should have no responsible part in restoring the Union. There was a certain amount of partisanship in this opinion, but there was also an honest belief that the Democratic party had forfeited all claims to public confidence by its anti-war record. There were two villains to Raymond's piece, the Democrats and the Radicals. Pressed to the choice, he would accept Radical reconstruction in preference to presidential restoration under Democratic control. There may have been more wisdom and less partisanship in such an attitude than appears at first sight, for Raymond probably was right in his belief that the country would not tolerate Democratic control under any circumstances.

Though Raymond's opposition to a new party can be understood, it is difficult to condone his refusal to accept a renomination to Congress. If he had been pledged to any one thing by his participation in the Philadelphia convention, it was to the support of proponents of the President's policy in the state and congressional elections. It was incumbent upon him, of all men, as the recognized leader of the administration forces in the House, to accept a renomination and to make a vigorous campaign for reelection. His refusal to do so was directly attributable to his belief that the Democratic organization had maneuvered itself into control of the post-convention movement in New York. Although the nomination for Congress was not in the gift of the Albany convention, there is no doubt that had he accepted it on the Philadelphia platform he would have been irreparably identified with the Albany ticket and platform. So great was his antipathy to the Albany convention and all its works that he actively supported Fenton, who had been nominated for governor by the Radical-controlled Republican convention.

Another factor tending to alienate Raymond from the administration faction was the President's refusal to endorse the

Fourteenth Amendment and recommend it to the South. The editor believed that the amendment would constitute a not unfair settlement of the most pressing problem before the country and that its acceptance by the South would result in the immediate restoration of the Union by the admission of southern representatives to Congress. Raymond had been confident all the previous winter and spring that an appeal to the people would find them solidly behind the President. But the results of the fall elections were to him conclusive evidence that the northern people favored congressional reconstruction as embodied in the amendment. He held it to be Johnson's duty to accept the popular verdict by terminating his conflict with Congress and by doing all in his power to insure the success of the congressional program. Johnson's stiff-necked refusal to do so caused the Times to join his critics.

The year 1867 found the Times definitely committed to the policies and fortunes of the Republican party, whatever they might be. Believing that Congress had demonstrated its power to force upon the South whatever measures it might determine upon, the Times' chief concern was for a speedy consummation of the congressional program. This desire for haste was dictated by the double consideration that the business needs of the country demanded a restored Union and that time worked in the interests of the Radicals. In its expression of opinion on economic matters not directly connected with the restoration of the South, the paper was more aggressive and sought actively to shape opinion within the party. It was insistent in its demands for a sound currency and for payment of the debt in gold. It was on the method of paying the debt that it finally turned on Johnson personally. It was consistent, though somewhat less vociferous, in its advocacy of a low tariff. Here, however, its ardor was somewhat damped by the possibility of a split in the Republican party if the issue were pressed.

The Times' attitude toward the impeachment proceedings was marked by an anxious consideration of their effect on the fortunes of the Republican party. Though the paper had opposed impeachment as unwarranted by facts, it proved callous in its indifference to the fate of Johnson as an individual. It was not prepared to controvert the substantial, because popular, justice of the expected removal of the President in the days when a verdict of guilty seemed inevitable. It feared, however, that success of the

prosecution would fasten more firmly the grip of the Radicals on the party.

The dislike of Raymond and the Times for the Radical group can be explained partly on the grounds of factional antipathy. The Greeley wing of the New York Republican party became Radical while the Seward-Weed-Raymond wing supported Johnson in the first years of Reconstruction. But apart from this consideration, the Radical purpose was in direct conflict with Raymond's belief that the Republican party should be "nationalized." He recognized and deplored the existence of forces tending to sectionalize the country as obstacles in the path of a true restoration of the Union. He felt that a redrawing of sectional lines would, in a sense, make the success of the Union arms a hollow victory.

Underneath all of Raymond's actions and every attitude of the Times lay his desire to see the Union restored. Viewed in this light, a consistency of purpose, if not of action, can be discerned. An uncompromising support of the war and of Lincoln's administration was inevitable. But the path was not so plain after the cessation of hostilities. Raymond would have preferred a conciliatory policy toward the South. When Congress insisted upon penalties he was willing to compromise, still hoping for a speedy restoration of the Union. When the South rejected the compromise, he was willing to forego all considerations of statesmanship and to support any program that Congress might devise in the hope of effecting a restored Union. Had he been less reasonable, he might have been more successful.

Raymond's contemporaries were blind to his purpose, but his every inconsistency of action was seized upon and remembered. His support of the presidential program in the spring and summer of 1866 won for him and his paper great unpopularity, as shown in the diminished circulation of the Times. The Times' repudiation of the presidential program in the fall of 1866 and its policy thereafter evidently met with popular approval, for by the time of Raymond's death in 1869 the paper had regained its lost circulation. In that year, the proprietors of the Times refused an offer of a million dollars for the property that had been established in 1851 on an investment of \$69,000.³

³Davis, History of the Times, 77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPT

Johnson MSS, Library of Congress.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

National Intelligencer, 1865.

Harper's Weekly, 1869.

New York Herald, 1866.

The Nation, 1866, 1869.

The New York Times, 1860-1869; the Times "Jubilee Supplement,"
Sept. 18, 1901.

PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, for
the Thirty-ninth Congress, First and Second Sessions.

McPherson, Edward, A Political Manual for 1866 and 1867, of Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Politico-Military, and General Facts, April 15, 1865, to April 1, 1867, and including the Development of the Presidential and the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction, with the Peculiarities of Each. Washington, 1867.

Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897. 10 vols. Washington, 1897.

The Congressional Globe, for the Thirty-Ninth Congress. First and Second Sessions.

WRITINGS OF RAYMOND AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES

Bigelow, John, Retrospections of an Active Life. 5 vols. New York, 1909, 1913.

Blaine, James G., Twenty Years of Congress: from Lincoln to Garfield. With a Review of the Events which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860. 2 vols. Norwich, Conn., 1893.

Brown, George R., ed., Reminiscences of Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada. New York, 1908.

Derby, J. C., Fifty Years among Authors, Books, and Publishers. New York, 1884.

- Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, with an Introduction by John T. Morse, Jr. 3 vols. Boston, 1911.
- "Doolittle Correspondence," in Publications of the Southern History Association, XI, 1907.
- Greeley, Horace, Recollections of a Busy Life: including Reminiscences of American Politics and Politicians, from the Opening of the Missouri Contest to the Downfall of Slavery. New York, 1868.
- Gurovski, Adam, Diary. 3 vols. Washington, 1866.
- Jennings, Louis J., "Mr. Raymond and Journalism," in the Galaxy, IX, 1870.
- McClure, Alexander K., Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times. Some Personal Recollections of War and Politics during the Lincoln Administration. 4th ed. Philadelphia, 1892.
- Maverick, Augustus, Henry J. Raymond and the New York Press, for Thirty Years. Progress of American Journalism from 1840 to 1870. Hartford, Conn., 1870.
- _____. "Henry J. Raymond and the 'Times'," in the Galaxy, VIII, 1869.
- Nicolay, John G., and Hay, John, Abraham Lincoln: A History. 10 vols. New York, 1914.
- Raymond, Henry J., The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, sixteenth President of the United States; together with His State Papers, including His Speeches, Addresses, Messages, Letters, and Proclamations, and the Closing Scenes Connected with His Life and Death. New York, 1865.
- Raymond, Henry W., ed., "Extracts from the Journal of Henry J. Raymond," No. IV., in Scribner's Monthly, XX, 1880.
- Young, John Russell, "Men Who Reigned," in Melville Phillips, ed., The Making of a Newspaper. New York, 1893.

BIOGRAPHIES

- Bancroft, Frederic, The Life of William H. Seward. 2 vols. New York, 1900.
- Barnes, Thurlow Weed, Memoir of Thurlow Weed, Boston, 1884.
- Hamlin, Charles Eugene, The Life and Times of Hamibal Hamlin, Cambridge, 1899.
- Ogden, Rollo, ed., Life and Letters of Edwin Lawrence Godkin. 2 vols. New York, 1907.

- Seitz, Don C., Horace Greeley, Founder of The New York Tribune. Indianapolis, 1926.
- Smith, William Ernest, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics. 2 vols. New York, 1933.
- Thayer, William Roscoe, The Life and Letters of John Hay. 2 vols. Boston, 1915.
- Winston, Robert W., Andrew Johnson, Plebian and Patriot. New York, 1928.
- Woodburn, James Albert, The Life of Thaddeus Stevens: A Study in American Political History, Especially in the Period of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Indianapolis, 1913.

GENERAL SECONDARY WORKS

- Alexander, DeAlva Stanwood, A Political History of the State of New York. 3 vols. New York, 1909.
- Beale, Howard K., The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction. New York, 1930.
- Brunner, Sidney David, Political History of New York State during the Period of the Civil War. New York, 1911.
- Davis, Elmer, History of The New York Times, 1851-1921. New York, 1921.
- Dewey, Davis Rich, Financial History of the United States. 10th ed. New York, 1928.
- Dunning, William Archibald, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics. Rev. ed. New York, 1931.
- _____. "The Second Birth of the Republican Party," in the American Historical Review, XVI.
- Fahrney, Ralph Ray, "Horace Greeley, The Tribune, and the Civil War." Chicago, 1929. Typed doctoral dissertation in the University of Chicago libraries.
- Harper, Joseph Henry, The House of Harper: A Century of Publishing in Franklin Square. New York, 1912.
- Kendrick, Benjamin B., The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction. 39th Congress, 1865-1867. New York, 1914.
- Lee, James Melvin, History of American Journalism. Rev. ed. Boston, 1923.
- Nevins, Allan, The Evening Post, A Century of Journalism. New York, 1922.
- Rhodes, James Ford, History of the United States from the Compro-

rise of 1850 to the Restoration of Home Rule at the South.
7 vols. New York, 1893-1906.

Stebbins, Homer Adolph, A Political History of the State of New York, 1865-1869. "Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law," LV, No. 1. New York, 1913.

Taussig, Frank W., The Tariff History of the United States. 5th ed., rev. New York, 1901.

